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PRINCIPLES OF U.S. FAMILY LAW
Vivian Hamilton*
What explains U.S. family law?  To answer this question, this Article 
undertakes a conceptual analysis of the legal practices that govern 
families. This analysis has yet to be done, and its absence hamstrings 
constructive thought on our family law.  The Article develops a typology 
that conceptualizes U.S. family law and exposes its underlying 
principles:  First, it identifies the significant elements, or rules, of f amily 
law.  Second, it demonstrates that these rules reflect or embody four 
important concepts – conjugality, privacy (familial as well as 
individual), contract, and parens patriae.  Finally, it shows that the 
concepts of family law in turn embody two distinct underlying principles 
– Biblical naturalism and liberal individualism.  From these powerful 
principles, we can derive modern U.S. family law:  they explain what our 
family law is.
With this deepened understanding of its structure, the Article next 
evaluates family law as the expression of it principles.  It concludes that 
each principle is individually flawed; and, taken together, they are too 
often in unproductive tension.  They thus doom U.S. family law to 
incoherence and must be revised.
At a minimum, this Article seeks to launch a much-needed debate in 
family law on whether our current foundational principles are desirable, 
or even defensible.  More ambitiously, the Article aims to ground a new
jurisprudence of family law that better reflects the social goals and needs 
of contemporary U.S. society.
INTRODUCTION
U.S. family law is chaotic.  Federal, state, and administrative bodies 
enact and apply constitutional, statutory, and judge-made laws.  Together 
these laws regulate families and family life, but it is a struggle to find 
thematic connection between one doctrine and the next.  The chaos that 
results is apparent not just to those who practice law or ponder it in the 
academy, but to any layperson who reads the newspaper.  Marriage 
promotion programs coexist with statutory schemes that promise speedy 
and painless divorces;1 same-sex couples and their families receive public 
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law.  
Harvard Law School J.D., cum laude, 1997; Yale College B.A., 1992.  Thanks to 
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz for his useful comments on an earlier draft, to 
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the Hodges Foundation for funding this research.
1 See infra notes 19, 35-36, and 61, and accompanying text.
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benefits and protections in many cases, while the Defense of Marriage 
Act, state constitutional amendments, and the proposed Federal Marriage 
Amendment all seek to withdraw or, at the least, keep them to a 
minimum;2 and parents’ rights (especially those of married parents) can 
receive greater consideration than the best interests of their children.3  The 
list goes on.
But is there a deeper coherence that unifies diverse family laws?  And 
if so, what is it?
The Article examines those questions and reaches two conclusions:  
First, there is an imperfect coherence to family law as it now exists, as two 
principles – Biblical naturalism and liberal individualism – link together 
and explain its central concepts.  Second, each principle is individually 
flawed; and, taken together, they are too often in unproductive tension.  
They thus doom U.S. family law to incoherence.
Biblical naturalism embraces a pre-modern notion of natural law 
molded by Biblical scripture and Judeo-Christian doctrine.4  It dictates a 
normative view of the “moral family”.  Liberal individualism emphasizes 
the atomistic individual and safeguards freedom in a secular and pluralistic 
society.  And from these powerful principles, we can derive modern U.S. 
family law:  they explain what our family law is.
This Article launches the development of a new normative 
jurisprudence of the laws regulating families.  The necessary first step of 
this larger project is a conceptual analysis of the legal practices that 
govern families.  The analysis resides at the intersection of positive and 
normative analysis, and it seeks to lay bare the ideological assumptions 
embodied in our institutional practices.  To do this, the Article applies a 
pragmatic methodology that eschews top-down deductive analysis, which 
would proffer philosophical principles that ought to serve as foundation of 
and justification for a legal system or institutional structure.  Analysis 
instead begins closer to the metaphorical middle, identifying those 
principles that currently do serve as foundation of and justification for our 
actual family law system.5
2 See infra note 129, and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 53-55, and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 69, and accompanying text.  “Biblical naturalism” is a term 
adopted for the sake of convenience, economy, and clarity.  It should be noted 
that it is unrelated to the works of Brian Leiter, who imports the term 
“naturalism” into legal theory to refer to the general belief that philosophical 
inquiry should refer to and depend upon empirical study.  See, e.g., Brian Leiter, 
Rethinking Legal Realism:  Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 267 (1997).
5
 H.L.A. Hart employed this process of criticism in books that explored 
various jurisprudential issues.  See generally, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW (adjudication); H.L.A. HART AND A.M. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 
(fault); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (criminal law).  The 
methodology was refined by legal philosopher Jules Coleman. See JULES 
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Identifying family law’s foundational principles is critical.  It exposes 
the underlying structure of family law and “deepens our understanding of 
its structure by displaying the coherence and mutual support of its 
component elements.”6  And it is only once the structure is clear that we 
can begin to evaluate family law, including its underlying principles, 
intelligently.7  This conceptual analysis of family law has yet to be done, 
and its absence hamstrings constructive thought on our family law.
The typology developed here to conceptualize U.S. family law and 
expose its principles is new:  First, it identifies the significant elements, or 
practices, of family law.8  Next, it examines those elements to reveal the 
concepts they embody.  It then examines the concepts and concludes that, 
along with its practices, they in turn embody the twin principles of 
Biblical naturalism and liberal individualism.  Family law’s practices and 
concepts thus effectuate and concretely express its principles.9
Scads of laws touch families in some way.  Part I begins with a brief 
discussion of the corpus juris of family law.  It comprises those rules that 
intentionally or directly (as opposed to incidentally) affect family 
relationships.  This Part then argues that these rules reflect or embody four 
important concepts:  conjugality (of the heterosexual sort), privacy 
(familial as well as individual), contract, and parens patriae.10
COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE:  IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST 
APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY xiv, 5-6 (2001).  This Article looks primarily to 
Coleman’s refinement for methodological guidance.
6 COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 23.
7
 Coleman argues for uncovering a legal system’s actual foundational 
principles:
[This places us] in a position to ask . . . how attractive the principles 
themselves are.  The key point is that the moral or justificatory questions 
are not prior to the explanatory ones, but can grow out of the explanatory 
project as it reveals the abstract principles in greater specificity and 
concreteness.
COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 6.
8
 There is no effort, however, to exhaustively chronicle U.S. family law.  A 
number of academics have ably and comprehensively described modern family 
law, and to do so here would not advance this project.  See, e.g., SANFORD N. 
KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA (2003); HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (2d. ed. 1988).  Instead, this 
Article outlines family law’s most salient features — those that give it its shape 
— thereby rendering it susceptible to analysis.
9 COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 6.
10
 Literally, “father of the country”.  Parens patriae power is the state’s 
power to act to protect from harm or promote the welfare of individuals who lack 
the capacity to act in their own best interests.  See, e.g., Developments in the Law 
– The Constitution and the Family (pt. 3), 93 HARV. L. REV. 1198, 1199 (1980).
For a discussion of its development as a doctrine, see Natalie Loder Clark, 
Parens Patriae:  History and Present Status of State Intervention into the Parent-
Child Relationship, in 1A CURRENT PERSPECTIVES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL, LEGAL 
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Part II argues that the concepts of family law in turn embody two 
distinct underlying principles — Biblical naturalism and liberal 
individualism.  It describes each and traces, both historically and 
thematically, how they have shaped our family law.  It identifies and 
further describes the concepts that figure in each principle and explains 
their interrelationships.
Part III concludes that liberal individualism and Biblical naturalism 
each have their flaws, and together they are irreconcilable.  The continued 
accommodation of both in law leads to incoherence and thwarts the 
achievement of important goals.  As each pulls family law in a different 
direction, lawmakers and members of an increasingly-divided populace 
may cling to one or the other principle, warts and all — but not both.  If 
family laws are to generate outcomes that achieve some level of purposive 
coherence – or at a minimum that do not undercut family law’s more 
important goals – the continued incorporation of both principles must be 
consciously and explicitly abandoned.  In their place we must substitute 
either a single unifying principle or an internally consistent set of 
principles.  Identifying the current principles of U.S. family law and 
understanding their individual and in-tandem shortcomings will advance 
that important project.
I. A TYPOLOGY OF U.S. FAMILY LAW: ITS CONCEPTS AND THE RULES 
THAT EMBODY THEM
A. THE METHODOLOGY
This Part examines the primary elements or rules of U.S. family law 
and argues that together they reflect its key concepts:  conjugality, 
privacy, contract, and parens patriae.  To come at it another way, each of 
these concepts warrants and is actualized by a range of inferences, and – if 
the list of concepts is correct and complete – this range of inferences 
corresponds with the important elements of our family law.  For example, 
one can infer from the concept of conjugality many of the key practical 
elements of our marriage laws—a formalized relationship between an 
opposite-sex couple that is presumptively enduring and through which sex 
and procreation are legitimated.  In this way, the rule or practice both 
reveals the content of the concept and can be inferred from it.11
Part II will argue that these concepts taken together in turn reflect 
general principles – Biblical naturalism and liberal individualism.  These 
AND ETHICAL ISSUES 109, 109-10 (Sandra Anderson Garcia & Robert Batey eds., 
1991).
11 See COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 7-10.  The rules of family law provide 
neither the concepts themselves nor the principles they embody with all of their 
content.  Other legal systems and a full range of social practices contribute to and 
can be embodied in them as well.  But the rules of family law certainly give the 
concepts and principles some, if not much, of their content.  See id. at 56-57.
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principles are embodied in the concepts and rules of U.S. family law and 
simultaneously explain it – not its every aspect, but its core.12
Two notes on the structure of the rules/concepts/principles construct 
are called for.  First, the reader should note that the boundaries between 
each category are not rigid; the categories are interconnected and must be 
viewed holistically.  Precise demarcation is not always possible.  Nor is it 
necessary – the goal of such a structure is to help illuminate the nature of a 
legal system, and this construct accomplishes that.
Second, the metaphorical structure represents a continuum of 
abstraction – from the law’s concrete practices to its theoretical 
underpinnings.13  This Article does not attempt to describe all points on 
that continuum, nor does it care to establish its endpoints.  The rules 
themselves, for instance, represent a level of abstraction and warrant their 
own inferences (related to execution, actual effect on individuals, etc.).  
And at the other extreme, principles may themselves embody other, 
higher-level principles, and so on.  The analysis focuses on this range 
within the continuum for a simple, practical reason:  any analysis or 
explanation of a social institution should, of course, be useful; it should 
illuminate the institution’s structure and reveal the coherence of its 
component parts.14  Near one endpoint of the continuum, the rules of 
family law provide evidence, though necessarily imperfect, of actual 
practice.  And from a purely practical perspective, they are vastly easier to 
work with than is, say, actual sociological data.  And near the other 
endpoint, the principles of Biblical naturalism and liberal individualism 
are the most useful, in this case, because they best explain our particular 
legal order.  An explanation of family law as an embodiment of some 
ultimate principle would fall short of these goals.  Ultimate principles 
explain our need for some legal order.15  Societal goals of self-
preservation, for instance, inform the family laws of all countries; focusing 
on that upper-level principle, however, tells us little about our family law.  
On the other hand, the closer one moves toward the levels of legal 
concepts and rules, the more difficult it is to see and discuss any 
overarching coherence.  As when viewing an impressionistic painting or a 
3-D poster, one needs some distance to make sense of what on too-close 
inspection appears to be a pointillist mess.
Let’s turn now to the system to be analyzed.
Family law, as conceived here, comprises those sets of laws (1) whose 
purpose is to regulate relationships among intimates, or (2) whose 
12 See COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 8.
13 See COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 55 n.1.
14 See COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 23.
15 See, e.g., WAYNE MORRISON, JURISPRUDENCE:  FROM THE GREEKS TO 
POST-MODERNISM 378-79 (1997) (discussing H.L.A. Hart’s thesis of the 
minimum content of natural law).
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operation hinges on the existence of a certain family status or 
relationship.16
Certain rules directly order family life and family relationships.  These 
include obvious examples like laws regulating marriage, divorce, and 
parenting.  Other rules – like those governing child custody and child 
support – regulate intimate relationships or affect individuals based on 
their relationships to others; these also belong in that category.  Similarly, 
various rules – those involving inheritance, tax, and insurance, to name a 
few – link important benefits and obligations to legal family status.17  It 
would be wrong to treat these kinds of laws as outside of family law or as 
existing merely in the penumbra of the core family law.  Indeed, a 
legislature may more successfully influence family composition through 
indirect means (e.g., by subsidizing via tax benefits certain family forms 
but not others18) than by more direct legislation (e.g., by making divorce 
difficult or impossible to obtain19).
16
 This view of family law is consistent with the contemporary view of 
family in the U.S.  The concept of what constitutes family and family law has 
evolved.  Nancy Cott has noted that at common law, the concept of “domestic 
relations” included “the relative privileges and duties of husbands and wives, 
employers and employees, and masters and slaves.”  NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC 
VOWS:  A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 6-7 (2000).  See, also, 
PETER W. BARDAGLIO, RECONSTRUCTING THE HOUSEHOLD:  FAMILIES, SEX, 
AND THE LAW IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH 25 (1995) (“Central to the
world view of . . . slaveholders was a broad conception of family, one that went 
beyond the nuclear unit to encompass nonnuclear kin, slaves, servants, and all 
other inhabitants of the plantation”.).  Contemporary treatises on family law more 
narrowly focus on relationships between intimates.  See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 
8; and CLARK, supra note 8.
17 See infra notes 56-59, and accompanying text.  At the risk of stating the 
obvious, my placing certain laws or systems of laws within the “family law” 
category does not imply that these laws belong exclusively within that category.  
Laws may be considered “family law” while simultaneously falling into 
categories of “tax law”, “employment law”, or others.
18 See, e.g., EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 11-28 (1997); 
Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties:  A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2000).
19 Historically, state legislative measures aimed at restricting divorce were 
unable to thwart the growing demand for dissolution. See generally HENDRICK 
HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA:  A HISTORY (2000); Developments in the 
Law – The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1996, 2087-91 
(2003); Joanna L. Grossman, Separated Spouses, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1613 (2001); 
Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language:  Divorce Law and Practice Before 
No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497 (2000); Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to 
the Joint Venture:  An Overview of Women’s Rights and Family Law in the 
United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2017 (2000).
Legislative divorce was a practice adopted by states that allowed state 
legislatures to issue divorces to couples on an ad hoc basis if, in the opinion of 
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Thus defined, these varied family laws embody four underlying 
concepts:  conjugality, contract, privacy, and parens patriae.  These 
concepts organize family law.
B. EMBODYING CONJUGALITY AND CONTRACT:  RULES OF MARRIAGE AND 
DIVORCE
1. Marriage and the Marital Family
Those rules of family law that formalize and shape the institution of 
marriage embody the concepts of conjugality, contract, and privacy.
Conjugality is a legal status (marriage), but it is also a powerful 
normative concept.20  The rules that both reflect and actualize the concept 
of conjugality include those that:  permit only opposite-sex couples to 
marry;21 limit to two the number of people who may enter into a 
marriage;22 require that marriages be presumptively enduring and 
the legislature, the couple was deserving.  Grossman, supra, at 1645.  Until the 
mid-nineteenth century, this was the only way that married couples could legally 
divorce in most states.  Id. at 1645.  This practice gave way to judicial divorce 
after most states enacted bans on divorce bills, as their legislatures were unable to 
meet the demand for divorces.  Id.  Fault-based judicial divorce replaced 
legislative divorce by the end of the 19th century.  See Lawrence M. Friedman, A 
Dead Language:  Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV.
1497 (2000).  Courts granted divorces only to “innocent” spouses who could 
persuasively demonstrate that the breakdown of the marriage was the fault of 
their partners.  Id.  Through the late 19th and into the 20th century, the demand for 
divorce grew, and some states responded by enacting more stringent divorce 
laws.  These measures, however, failed to reduce demand.  Id. at 1502-03.  Some 
husbands and wives who both wished to divorce colluded to present (perjured) 
evidence of fault; others traveled to states where divorce was easier to obtain.  Id. 
at 1503-04.  Ultimately, states accepted that efforts to enforce couples’ 
commitments were doomed to fail.  Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the 
Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 79 (1991).  With the single exception of 
Arkansas, every state in the country has thus adopted some version of a no-fault 
divorce regime, granting divorce upon a showing that the marriage is 
irretrievably broken.  Id. at 90.
20 See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Our Sacred Institution:  The Ideal of 
the Family in American Law and Society, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 387.
21
 Massachusetts is (so-far) the singular exception.  Goodridge v. 
Massachusetts held the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage 
“incompatible with the [Massachusetts] constitutional principles of respect for 
individual autonomy and equality under law."  798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 
2003).  The First Circuit in Largess v. Massachusetts refused to enjoin the 
implementation of Goodridge.  373 F.3d 219, 219-21 (1st Cir. 2004).  Together, 
Goodridge and Largess made Massachusetts the first state in the union to permit 
same-sex marriages.
22
 All states prohibit polygamy.  See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 
(1878) (affirming criminal conviction of Mormon man who participated in plural 
PRINCIPLES OF U.S. FAMILY LAW
8
dissoluble only by the state;23 impose on married couples – viewed in 
important respects as a single unit – mutual obligations of support;24 and 
declare marriage to be the locus for legitimate sex and procreation.25
Rules governing entry into marriage have changed little since the 
country’s founding and reflect not only the concept of conjugality, but also 
marriage); Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
474 U.S. 849 (1988) (declining to extend constitutional right to privacy to protect 
plural marriage).
23
 Every state has implemented statutes requiring judicial approval and 
declaration of divorce.  See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 204-08; 498-504 (1988).
24
 For a discussion of the development of the notion of conjugal unity, see 
infra notes 123-25, and accompanying text.  Eight states, for example, retain 
interspousal tort immunities, on the theory that a person can’t sue him- or herself.  
See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 845-46 
(2004).  Through the doctrine of necessaries, retained by two-thirds of all states, 
states require spouses to provide material support to each other.  The doctrine 
requires a spouse to pay debts incurred by the other for the purchase of 
“necessary” items.  See Id. at n. 34 (cataloging the states that retain the doctrine).  
Other rules demonstrate the notion of conjugal unity by protecting spouses’ 
interests in each others’ bodies, companionship, and services.  Tort doctrines, for 
instance, permit a spouse to sue for loss of consortium when her partner has been 
injured.  See Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 491, 503-04 (2005) (discussing marital consortium doctrine and 
cataloguing cases acknowledging doctrine).  See also JoEllen Lind, Valuing 
Relationships:  The Role of Damages for Loss of Society, 35 N.M. L. REV. 301, 
314-15 (2005) (discussing the history of the claim for loss of consortium) .
25
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 
129 (1989), provides a striking example of the societal importance attributed to 
the conjugal family.  Here, the Court held that states may decide that any child 
born to a married woman may be treated as a legal child of the marriage (so long 
as husband and wife agree to this).  Actual paternity is irrelevant.  And the 
biological father’s connection affords him no rights vis-à-vis the child.  What 
explains such a rule, where legal status creates a paternal fiction that can trump 
actual biological connection?  The answer is a view that stable marital families 
are a critical social good, and thus preservation of the conjugal relationship and 
family outweighs recognition of biological parentage.  The concept of 
conjugality thus explains the rule.
States have historically promoted conjugality not only by directly supporting 
that relationship but also by prohibiting intimate sex acts outside of marriage.  
Such prohibitions have all but disappeared, as courts have extended privacy 
protections to such acts.  Yet some states retain laws (despite a near-certain 
inability to constitutionally enforce them, in light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)) that prohibit consensual 
sodomy, fornication, or adultery.  See Singson v. Virginia, 621 S.E.2d 682 (Va. 
Ct. App 2005) (stating that Lawrence did not declare all sodomy statutes facially 
unconstitutional).  See also, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403(1) (2003).  
After Lawrence, the constitutional validity of any such prohibition is highly 
doubtful.  See 539 U.S. 558, 578.
PRINCIPLES OF U.S. FAMILY LAW
9
that of contract. 26  Embodying aspects of contract, rules require that 
marriages be entered voluntarily and consent freely given; marriages 
entered under duress or coercion, or otherwise absent true consent, are 
void.27
Once married, however, laws convert a couple’s private relationship to 
a state-regulated legal status.  That status is much more alterable than it 
once was, but even today, those of its terms considered essential to that 
status are unalterable.  Couples usually may not alter by contract the rules 
that govern their ongoing marriages.28  Courts refuse to enforce, for 
instance, agreements providing that one spouse will compensate the other 
for domestic services.29  Their reasoning is that mutual entitlement to 
support and domestic services is an essential aspect of the conjugal 
status.30
Another basic, unalterable aspect of conjugality is its presumed 
lifelong status.  Couples cannot pre-establish the duration of their 
marriages – once entered, a marriage presumptively continues until the 
death of either spouse.  Nor may couples unilaterally dissolve their legal 
marriages; only the state by divorce decree may do so.  Together with the 
essentially unalterable nature of the intact marital relationship itself, these 
examples demonstrate the continued primacy of the concept of conjugality 
in family law.31  The rules of divorce have softened some of the more 
26
 The essentials of marriage have long included both mutual consent and 
capacity.  See WALTER C. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PERSONS AND 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS, ROGER W. COOLEY, ED. 6 (3d ed. 1921) [hereinafter 
TIFFANY’S DOMESTIC RELATIONS].  To have the “capacity” to marry, couples 
could face no impediment of relationship (consanguinity or other prohibited 
degrees of kinship), incapacity for sexual intercourse, preexisting marriage, or 
“civil conditions”—i.e., race.  Id. at 25-36.  Tiffany notes that “in many states, 
marriages between negroes, Indians, or Chinese, and white persons, are 
prohibited.” Id. at 30.  Of these “essentials”, only the requirement that the couple 
not violate certain racial criteria has been eliminated.  See Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
27
 Consent must be given absent fraud, duress, mistake, or incapacity.  
Insanity, intoxication, or nonage could render a party incapable of giving true 
consent.  TIFFANY’S DOMESTIC RELATIONS at 7-25.  See also Elizabeth S. Scott 
& Robert E. Scott, Marriage as a Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 
1257 (1998).
28 See Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 24, at 836-41.
29
 Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 24, at 840-41, n. 38 
(cataloguing state court decisions).
30 Id.
31 See Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in THE FALL AND RISE 
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 256 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999).  Posner argues:
[W]e are far from a system in which parties are free to contract for any 
marital arrangement that they want . . . [P]otential mates cannot bind 
themselves legally to marriages in which spouses’ domestic, financial, and
sharing obligations are specified by contract.  Polygamous and same-sex 
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constraining aspects of conjugality, but they have not altered its essential 
form.  We turn next to those elements of family law.
2. Divorce
Unlike laws governing entry into marriage, laws governing divorce 
have changed radically since the country’s founding.32  Early laws 
enforced lifelong conjugality.  In the colonies and the early days of the 
country, the marital relationship was virtually indissoluble.33  States 
gradually permitted judicial divorce, but only to an innocent party who 
could prove the “fault” of his or her spouse—through adultery, violence, 
cruelty, incurable insanity, etc.34  Not until the latter part of the twentieth 
century did states begin permitting couples to divorce based essentially 
upon a showing that they were no longer compatible.35  These changes in 
the rules and practices of family law relaxed one of the more stringent 
(and least successful36) requirements of conjugality and simultaneously 
expanded some individuals’ abilities to determine their intimate lives.
But even in the current “no-fault” era, conjugality perseveres.  Divorce 
is not automatic, nor is it always easy.  Many states in fact permit 
relatively quick and easy divorce only if both parties consent to the 
dissolution of the marriage.  When one spouse opposes dissolution, family 
law rules require courts to put on the brakes and more deeply inquire into 
the couple’s relationship.  Usually, the petitioning spouse may then prove 
irreparable deterioration of the marriage relationship by showing that the 
couple has lived separate and apart (without engaging in sexual relations) 
for a statutorily prescribed period of time.37  In some states, a couple must 
marriages are prohibited.  These laws are . . . restrictions on freedom of 
marital contract, and they strikingly distinguish family law from contract 
law.”
Id.  Hasday has also argued that to claim that the family law has moved from 
status to individual ordering through contract overstates changes that have 
occurred.  Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, supra note 24, at 834-48.  Most 
commentators emphasize the radical changes and “contractualization” of family 
law.  See, e.g., Jana Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 
1443 (1992); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of 
American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985).
32 See Shaakirrah R. Sanders, The Cyclical Nature of Divorce in the Western 
Legal Tradition, 50 LOY. L. REV. 407 (2004) (tracking the evolution of Western 
divorce law).
33 See supra note 19, and accompanying text.
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 See id.
37
 More than half of all state divorce statutes impose “separate-and-apart” 
requirements.  Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty 
States: An Overview, 21 FAM. L.Q. 417, 442 tbl.1 (1988).
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be separated for at least two years before a court will grant a divorce over 
the objection of one of the parties.38
Even when they allow marital bonds to be severed, states’ laws have 
historically treated marital obligations of support (usually a husband’s 
duty to support his wife) as enduring.39  Alimony or spousal support has 
since become less favored (and officially gender-neutral).40  Its goals have 
also evolved from ensuring ongoing support to include “rehabilitating” a 
spouse who has been unemployed or underemployed during the marriage 
in order to facilitate her reentry into the workforce, thus ensuring 
economic self-sufficiency;41 and reimbursing a spouse who has 
contributed (usually services) to the marriage “partnership”.42  Parties 
generally have the freedom, moreover, to privately order through contract 
some of the important consequences of marital dissolution.43
Family law rules that permit couples to enter agreements establishing 
the financial consequences of dissolution actualize the concept of contract.  
States (with varying degrees of skepticism) generally recognize and 
enforce premarital agreements that set the financial terms of dissolution.44
Some of the legal rules affecting marriage and divorce reflect the 
concept of contract, and many of the developments in these family law 
rules aim to further equality and individual self-determination.  But 
38
 Ten states and Puerto Rico impose a two-year minimum separate-and-apart 
requirement. Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States, supra note 37, at
442 tbl.1.
39
 Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. 
L. REV. 75, 122 (2004).
40 See Lee. E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. 
REV. 1135, 1162 (1985).
41
 Michelle Murray, Alimony as an Equalizing Force in Divorce, 11 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 314 (1997).
42
 Murray, supra note 41, at 313.
43
 The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, adopted by half of the states, 
authorizes couples to determine by contract the financial consequences of the 
marriage’s dissolution.  UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT (1983).  But 
aspects of those agreements that purport to resolve nonfinancial issues such as 
custody of children or conduct during the marriage are typically not binding.  
See, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.08 (2002).
44 See Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, supra note 24, 
at 507 (noting that prenuptial agreements were not favored by early common law, 
but modern state courts generally recognize and even encourage the use of these 
agreements); Karen Servidea, Reviewing Premarital Agreements to Protect the 
State’s Interest in Marriage, 91 VA. L. REV. 535, 536-40 (2005) (tracking the 
historical development of premarital agreements, and state courts’ increasing 
willingness to enforce them); Developments in the Law – The Law of Marriage 
and Family, supra note 19, at 2075-98 (outlining developments in the 
enforcement of prenuptial agreements).
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conjugality’s essential aspects (as legal status and normative concept) 
remain, and remain largely unchanged.
We turn now to the laws of parenting and child welfare.
C. EMBODYING CONJUGALITY, PRIVACY AND PARENS PATRIAE:  RULES OF 
PARENTING AND CHILD WELFARE
The concept of privacy restrains the state’s ability to interfere in the 
family.  Its counterpoise, parens patriae, empowers the state to interfere 
when necessary to protect families’ more vulnerable members.45  Along 
with conjugality, these concepts are embodied in the various rules 
governing parenting and child welfare.
Long before the Supreme Court explicitly named it a constitutionally-
protected individual right, states implicitly recognized and respected the 
concept of family privacy.46  The concept of family privacy historically 
recognized paternal authority over and obligations towards both wives and 
children.47  Today, that concept shapes family law rules that largely permit 
parents to raise their children as they see fit, generally free from state 
interference.  Parents share significant authority—a constitutionally-
protected fundamental “right”—over their children.48
The concept of family privacy is in tension with the concept of parens 
patriae.  Family laws have expanded the state’s powers to protect 
children.49  But the expansion of the influence of parens patriae on rules 
of parenting and child welfare does not necessarily demonstrate a 
weakening of respect for parents’ rights and family privacy; but instead, 
both (1) an increased recognition of children as full persons, themselves 
entitled to individual rights; and (2) the state’s own interest in its future 
citizenry.
Indeed, parens patriae has not come close to superseding the concept 
of family privacy, especially that of the conjugal family.50  The state 
intervenes in the “intact” family in limited situations51 – namely, when it 
perceives a serious threat to the physical or mental health of the child, and 
even then, not in all cases.52
45 See supra note 10.
46 See infra notes 131-132, and accompanying text.
47 See infra notes 154-159, and accompanying text.
48
 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982).
49 See infra notes 172-176, and accompanying text.
50 See supra note 25, and accompanying text.
51 CLARK, supra note 8, at § 9.4.
52 See, e.g, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (“[So long as a parent 
adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no 
reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family”); Marjorie 
Frieman, Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under the Law:  State Child Abuse 
Statutes, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243 (1982).  The state has struggled with cases 
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The “best interests of the child” standard expresses the state’s parens 
patriae role and has been widely adopted by state legislatures to guide 
judges making custodial and other decisions related to children.  But this 
standard is not intended to ensure that parents generally act in the “best
interests” of their children. Instead, parents are presumed to act in their 
children’s best interests.53 When marriages or nonmarital households in 
which children are being raised fail, parties sometimes turn to the judicial 
system to resolve child custody disputes.  But judges make a small 
percentage of custody determinations; generally, parents agree to a post-
dissolution custodial arrangement. 54
Once in the courts, respect for family privacy and parental rights can 
clash with, and indeed supersede, children’s interests and the state’s 
parens patriae power.  Even after a child has bonded with a non-parent 
caretaker (in the event a parent has been found neglectful or has 
temporarily surrendered custody of her child to another), for instance, the 
parent seeking to regain custody will almost always have a superior claim 
to custody over his or her natural child.  When courts decide such “parent 
vs. third-party” claims, they generally may not order a custodial 
arrangement they consider to be in a child’s best interests acontextually; 
the parent benefits from the proverbial thumb on the scale.55
The concepts of family privacy and conjugality are expressed by rules 
that respect the notion of parents’ “rights” over their children.  But 
parents’ rights are by no means absolute; increased recognition of children 
where parents refuse medical care for a seriously ill or disabled child because of 
their assessment that treatment will be futile.  A federal statute characterizes 
medical non-treatment as a form of child abuse.  Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act (CAPTA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5105 (1999), and Child Abuse 
Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 5106(g) (1994).  However, CAPTA requires 
states to include spiritual treatment exemptions to protect those parents whose 
refusal to consent to medical treatment for a child is based on religious beliefs.  
Id.  But subsequent regulations promulgated pursuant to CAPTA by the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare excluded the spiritual treatment 
exemption.  See Elizabeth A. Lingle, Treating Children by Faith:  Colliding 
Constitutional Issues, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 301, 307 (1996).  For a discussion 
focusing on children’s rights, see James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon:  
Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Laws, as Denials of Equal 
Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321 (1996).
53
 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (“[T]here is a presumption that fit 
parents act in the best interests of their children.”).
54
 Courts generally respect parental decision-making and approve child 
custody arrangements reached by parents; and in 80 to 90 percent of cases, 
parents do reach agreement.  See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. 
MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:  SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 
134 (1992).
55 See Developments in the Law – The Law of Marriage and Family, supra 
note 19, at 2053-54.
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as individuals in their own right, needing and deserving protection, helps 
explain the state’s parens patriae interventions in the private family.
D. EMBODYING ALL OF THE ABOVE:  RULES THAT DEPEND ON FAMILY 
STATUS
Laws whose operation hinges on family status embody the same 
concepts identified and discussed above, but in particular conjugality.  
Employment and insurance laws, tax laws, probate and inheritance laws, 
evidentiary rules, and aspects of tort law condition legal rights and 
financial benefits on the legal status of familial relationships. 56  Married 
couples receive myriad public protections and benefits, including social 
security insurance, employment and retirement benefits, inheritance and 
estate benefits, and entitlements under federal immigration law, to name 
but a few.57  Most of these laws support the conjugal relationship and 
family; the exceptions are generally, at worst, neutral with respect to 
family form.58  Social Security, for instance, ensures the financial security 
of a non-wage-earning spouse or former should her partner become 
incapacitated or die.59  A non-wage- earning single parent, however, must 
56 See 42 U.S.C. §402(a)-(e) (providing derivative Social Security insurance 
benefits to the spouse, ex-spouse, or widow of an insured worker); Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 
(regulating private employee benefit plans and allocating rights according to 
family status); 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2) (2000) (exempting from numerical 
limitations on immigration individuals according to family status).  See also, 
Report to the Honorable Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, 
House of Representatives, “The Defense of Marriage Act,” Jan. 31, 1997, Federal 
Document Clearing House, General Accounting Office, GAO/OCG 97-16 
(reporting that more than 1,000 places in federal law alone link rights or benefits 
to marriage).  See also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993) (listing the 
many benefits provided exclusively to the marital couple, including:  state 
income tax advantages, public economic assistance (including Social Security 
benefits), property rights, child custody awards, dower payments, inheritance 
rights, the right to spousal support, and the automatic right to change one’s 
name).
57 Id.
58
 One sometime – and unintentional – exception is the so-called “marriage 
penalty”, where some dual-income marital families pay higher federal taxes than 
if they were to file singly.  Some commentators argue that the federal tax 
structure benefits the marital family with a single- or primary-wage-earning 
spouse.  See, e.g., EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 11-28 (1997); 
Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties:  A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2000); Marjorie Kornhauser, Love, Money 
and IRS:  Family, Income-Sharing and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 
HASTINGS L.J. 63, 64 (1993).
59 See supra note 56, and accompanying text.
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rely on need-based public programs that provide subsistence-level 
assistance.60  Such programs emphasize self-sufficiency, but increasingly 
are including incentives for poor families to conform to conjugal norms.61
Myriad laws more incidentally affect families but don’t belong in the 
category of family law.  Compulsory education laws, for example, 
constrain parents’ freedom to educate or not educate their children in the 
manner in which they see fit.  Mandatory immunization laws similarly 
deprive parents of some control over their children.  The purpose of such 
laws, however, is not to affect families or family life; nor does their 
operation depend upon family status.62  In both examples, interference 
with parental authority is necessary but incidental.  In short, while most 
laws affecting children interfere in some way with parental authority, they 
ought not all be considered family law as such.
The legal rules, or elements, of U.S. family law thus embody 
underlying concepts of conjugality, privacy, contract, and parens patriae.  
The next Part argues that these concepts in turn embody underlying ideals, 
or principles.
II. PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW
“[I]n certain kinds of practices, the inferential roles of concepts may be 
seen to hang together in a way that reflects a general principle.  The 
principle can then be said to be embodied in the practice and, at the same 
time, to explain it.”63
The concepts of U.S. family law discussed above embody two 
foundational principles:  Biblical naturalism and liberal individualism.64
60 See Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided:  A Legal History of the 
Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299 (2002).
61 See Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2003, 
H.R. 4, 108th Cong. §103(b) (providing $100 million/year to states for “healthy 
marriage promotion activities”).
62
 The goals of compulsory education, for instance, include helping secure 
the future liberty of the individual child and ensuring the future well-being of 
both the child and of society generally.  To that end, public education is provided 
by the state directly and without cost to all U.S. children.  Similarly, mandatory 
immunization laws reflect public health concerns.
63 COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 8.
64 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977).  Dworkin uses 
the term “principle” to refer to “a standard that is to be observed . . . because it is 
a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality.”  Id.  A 
principle states or embodies a social goal or political value.  See also, BRIAN BIX, 
JURISPRUDENCE:  THEORY AND CONTEXT 87 (3d ed. 2004) (defining principles 
as “moral propositions that are stated in or implied by past official acts.”).
Principles inform legislative and judicial pronouncement of rules.  See 
DWORKIN, supra, at 22.  “They seem most energetically at work, carrying most 
PRINCIPLES OF U.S. FAMILY LAW
16
The following Sections examine first the development of the principles, 
and then the mechanics and character of their influence on U.S. family 
law.
A. BIBLICAL NATURALISM AND ITS INFLUENCE ON U.S. FAMILY LAW
“[W]hen the Supreme Being formed the universe, and created matter out 
of nothing, he impressed certain principles upon that matter, from which 
it can never depart . . .”65
That the Judeo-Christian tradition has helped shape U.S. family law is 
quite beyond dispute.66  Law and religion scholar John Witte, Jr. reminds 
us that “[t]he laws born of the Catholic and Protestant models of marriage 
are not the artifacts of an ancient culture . . . Until the twentieth century, 
this was our law in much of the West, notably in England and America.”67
There are two, more disputable issues:  The first involves identifying 
the contours of this tradition through its inferential role in the concepts and 
practices of U.S. family law.68  This Article argues that family law’s 
concepts and practices combine in a way that reflects a pre-modern69 view 
weight, in difficult lawsuits . . . [In these difficult cases,] principles play an 
essential part in arguments supporting judgments about particular legal rights and 
obligations.  After the case is decided, we may say that the case stands for a 
particular rule. . . But the rule does not exist before the case is decided; the court 
cites principles as its justification for adopting and applying a new rule.”
65 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
VOL. I (1807).  Blackstone refers here to the creation story of Genesis.
66
 Its influence, however, has received surprisingly little scholarly attention 
from the legal academy.  Allusions to the Christian derivation of U.S. family 
practice are not uncommon, but few legal commentators have systematically 
explored the connection.  One exception is John Witte, Jr., who has traced the 
influence of Christian theological traditions on the development of Western legal 
principles.  JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT:  MARRIAGE, 
RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION (1997).  Witte focuses on the 
various different Christian theologies (Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, and 
Anglican) and their effect primarily on Western Europe, but also on the United 
States.  See also, FRANCES GIES AND JOSEPH GIES, MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 
IN THE MIDDLE AGES 36-42 (1987) (discussing the historical impact of 
Christianity on family life generally).  See generally, Andrew H. Friedman, 
Same-Sex Marriage and the Right to Privacy:  Abandoning Scriptural, 
Canonical, and Natural Law Based Definitions of Marriage, 35 HOW. L.J. 173 
(1992).
67 See WITTE, supra note 66, at 12.  See also, MARY ANN GLENDON, STATE, 
LAW, AND FAMILY:  FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
WESTERN EUROPE (1977).
68 See COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 8.
69
 Significant differences exist between medieval (or pre-modern) and 
modern theories of natural law.  Pre-modern theories argued the existence of a 
universal law derived from God, and the existence of objective moral principles 
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of natural law filtered through Judeo-Christian theology—Biblical 
naturalism.  The second issue is the extent to which this tradition 
continues to animate our law.  The conventional wisdom is that the 
progress of U.S. family law has been a steady march “from status to 
contract” or from public to private ordering.70  This Article counters that 
Biblical naturalism retains a powerful grasp on our family law even – or 
perhaps especially – today.
The next three Sections trace the development of the key ideas that 
make up Biblical naturalism71 and describe its specific influences on 
family law.  They argue that this principle has not only remained a strong 
undercurrent in U.S. family law, but also that it is enjoying a period of 
renewed prominence and influence in public discourse.  The first and 
second Sections highlight significant aspects of the Jewish and Christian 
family traditions, respectively.  The third Section discusses pre-modern 
natural law theories that predominated in the early U.S. and which 
incorporated key elements of the Judeo-Christian tradition, helping shape 
first English, then U.S. family law.
1. The Jewish Tradition
The Hebrew Covenant, recorded between the latter half of the ninth 
and early part of the eighth centuries B.C., set down laws that had been in 
effect for as many as three hundred years prior.72  While Jewish society 
was in many respects similar to other societies of the time,73 Hebrew law 
is notable in that its more than 600 commandments purportedly come 
dictated by nature and discoverable by reason.  See LLOYD WEINREB, NATURAL 
LAW AND JUSTICE 53 (1987).  The Renaissance saw the beginning of the 
secularization of natural law.  Id. at 108-10. In the 18th  century, Hume 
developed a modern, secular theory of natural law.  See D. FORBES, HUME’S 
PHILOSOPHICAL POLITICS (1975).
70 See supra note 31, and accompanying text.
71
 For more exhaustive treatment of the history of the Church and family, see 
generally, THEODORE MACKIN, MARRIAGE IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH:  
DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE (1984).
72
 Frank Alvarez-Pereyre and Florence Heymann, The Desire for 
Transcendence:  the Hebrew Family Model and Jewish Family Practices, in A 
HISTORY OF THE FAMILY VOL. I:  DISTANT WORLDS, ANCIENT WORLDS 155 
(Andre Burguiére, et al., eds., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1996).  The 
five Books of Moses (the Pentateuch) – the foundation of Hebrew law – are 
complemented by the Talmud, a body of rabbinical writings which seeks to 
define rules and laws even more precisely.  Id. at 155, 158.
73
 Jean-Jacques Glassner, From Sumer to Babylon: Families as Landowners 
and Families as Rulers, in A HISTORY OF THE FAMILY VOL. I:  DISTANT 
WORLDS, ANCIENT WORLDS 104 (Andre Burguiére, et al., eds., Belknap Press of 
Harvard Univ. Press 1996).
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directly from God.74  Its provisions have thus carried throughout history 
the added weight of divine ordination.  A description of these provisions
germane to family law follows.
Patriarchy.  One of Jewish law’s most important provisions concerned 
male leadership of the family.  In the Old Testament, God enters into a 
Covenant with Abraham alone, excluding his wife Sarah and giving 
“divine sanction to the leadership of the patriarch over his family and 
tribe.”75  The patriarch exercised authority over his wife and children, and 
the practice of agnatic descent ensured the continuation of that authority 
through future generations.
Monogamy and polygyny.  Jewish law favored monogamy but did not 
forbid concubinage and polygyny.76  Thus while some Jewish 
communities were monogamous, in others, polygyny endured well into the 
Middle Ages.  In some communities, demographic and economic 
pressures limited its practice (a man had to be wealthy to obtain and 
maintain numerous wives); in others local civil laws and custom 
(including in Christian environments) squelched the practice.77
Entry into marriage.  In order to effectuate a legal marriage, Hebrew 
marriage law required payment by the man’s father to the future wife’s 
father, and the transfer to the wife of a dowry by her father.78  The 
couples’ consent was important, and the marriage became effective after 
the couple had executed a contract (ketubah), cohabited, and 
consummated their relationship.79
Procreation.  The importance of marital procreation is highlighted 
early in the Old Testament, where God directs man and woman to “be 
fruitful and multiply.”80
74 MOSES MIELZINER, THE JEWISH LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN 
ANCIENT AND MODERN TIMES, AND ITS RELATION TO THE LAW OF THE STATE 
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1987) (1884)  “The Bible contains laws as well as 
ethical doctrines . . . [A]ll laws contained in these books of Moses are proclaimed 
in the name of God, who is the source of all ethical truth . . .”  Id. at 14.
75 GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 190 (1986).
76 MIELZINER, supra note 74.  Mielziner notes that the law “endured” 
polygamy but did not sanction it.  Parts of the Old Testament provide for 
polygyny (21 Exodus 9; 18 Leviticus 18; 21 Deuteronomy 15-17), but other 
provisions presume monogamy as the norm (20 Deuteronomy 7; 24:5; 25:5-11).
77
 Alvarez-Pereyre & Heymann, supra note 72, at 182-84.  (It should be 
noted that “[b]y [Judaism’s] Roman period, monogamy seems to have been the 
common practice.”  THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE BIBLE 496 (Bruce M. 
Metzger and Michael D. Coogan, eds., 1993).
78
 22 Exodus 15-16; 22 Deuteronomy 28-29.  Alvarez-Pereyre & Heymann, 
supra note 72, at 175.  With trivial exception, the consent of both parties was also 
required.  MIELZINER, supra note 74, at x.
79
 Pereyre & Heymann, supra note 72, at 175-76.
80
 1 Genesis 28.
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Ending marriage.  A husband could unilaterally divorce his wife by 
giving her a bill (a get) terminating their marriage and dismissing her.81
These key elements of Jewish family law were then absorbed, for the 
most part, into the Christian tradition.  The Christian family tradition, 
however, differs in a number of important respects from that of the Jewish 
tradition.82  The next Section touches on its more important elements and 
notes several significant areas where the Christian family tradition 
diverges from its Jewish roots.
2. The Christian Tradition
The early Christian church viewed marriage as “subject to the law of 
nature, communicated in reason and conscience, and often confirmed in 
the Bible.”83 Jesus and St. Paul both spoke at length about the marital 
family, “and their teachings have been the cornerstone of the Western 
tradition of marriage for nearly two millennia.”84  Beginning with their 
formalization in the twelfth century, the church’s theology and laws of 
marriage became widely communicated and profoundly influential.85  A 
description of its primary family traditions follows.
Patriarchy/marital unity.  The husband’s authority over the marital 
household in the Jewish tradition gave way in the New Testament to a 
more explicit description of the married couple as a unit, led by the 
husband:  Paul’s letters to the early Christian churches teach that husbands 
and wives “shall become one flesh”, but that “the husband is the head of 
the wife.”86  The Christian tradition thus retained the patriarchy of the 
Jewish tradition but placed greater emphasis on unity.
Monogamy. The combination of monogamy and polygyny that had 
existed in the Jewish tradition gave way to a full commitment to 
monogamy in early Christianity.87  The primary purpose of monogamy 
was not procreation, however, but chastity.  The early Church sought to 
control sexual desires and sexual conduct; some, including St. Augustine, 
81
 24 Deuteronomy 1.  Pereyre & Heymann, The Desire for Transcendence:  
the Hebrew Family Model and Jewish Family Practices, supra note 72, at 178-
79.  This allowance for divorce ended sometime after the beginning of 
Christianity.  MIELZINER, supra note 74, at x.
82 GIES & GIES, supra note 66, at 37-40 (noting that, in comparing the Old 
and New Testaments, theologian St. Augustine “found a number of recurring 
tenets but not a completely harmonious consistency” and discussing key family-
related distinctions).
83 WITTE, supra note 66, at 25.
84 Id. at 16.
85 GIES & GIES, supra note 66, at 37; WITTE, supra note 66, at 16.
86
 5 Ephesians 23-32.
87 NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS:  A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE 
NATION 5-6 (2000).
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viewed sex as per se sinful.88  Celibacy, which encouraged a close 
spiritual connection to the kingdom of God, was thought to be superior to 
marriage.89  But monogamous marriage was still useful, according to one 
early theologian, because it “sets a limit to desire by teaching us to keep 
one wife [and] is the natural remedy to eliminate fornication.”90  God 
created marriage “to make us chaste, and to make us parents.” 91  Marriage 
was a “remedy” provided by God for otherwise-illicit lust.
Entry into marriage.  Church teachings emphasized the importance of 
mutual consent and voluntariness for marriage to be legitimate.
Procreation and sex.  The Old Testament made procreation 
mandatory,92 but the New Testament merely paid it lip-service.93  St. 
Augustine, already viewing the world as old and in decline, observed in 
the fifth century that “there is not the need for procreation that there once 
was.”94
Nonetheless, during the Reformation, procreation eclipsed libido-
control as the primary goal of marriage.  Marital procreation was a good, 
although it remained a lesser good than celibate spirituality and 
contemplation.  Marriage’s secondary goal, however, continued to be the 
control of sinful lust.  Marriage rendered sex, not good, but licit.  But it 
perpetuated the species and expanded the Church.  The Church thus came 
to prohibit contraception, abortion, and infanticide.95
The Church sought to closely control sex generally.  St. Paul’s letters 
contain litanies of prohibited sexual sins, which included lust, 
homosexuality, sodomy, prostitution, polygamy, and excessive 
primping.96
Ending marriage.  Another significant difference between the early 
Jewish and Christian traditions concerned the end of marriage.  As noted 
above, a Jewish husband could divorce his wife, on his terms.97  This 
became impossible in the Christian tradition, with a single exception – a 
man could divorce a wife who had herself fornicated or committed 
88 WITTE, supra note 66, at 21.
89
 One early Church thinker, on a scale of values, rated virginity at 100, 
widowhood at 60, and marriage at 30.  DAVID HERLIHY, MEDIEVAL 
HOUSEHOLDS 22 (1985); GIES & GIES, supra note 66, at 39.
90 WITTE, supra note 66, at 20 (quoting John Chrysostom, Sermon on 
Marriage, in ST. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM ON MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE 85 (St. 
Vladimir’s Press 1986).  See also 1 Corinthians 7.
91 WITTE, supra note 66, at 24.
92
 1 Genesis 28.
93 GIES & GIES, supra note 66, at 37.
94 ST. AUGUSTINE, TREATISES ON MARRIAGE AND OTHER SUBJECTS 21-22 
(Charles T. Wilcox, et al., trans., New York 1955).
95 WITTE, supra note 66, at 25.
96 Id. at 18.
97 See supra note 81, and accompanying text.
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adultery.98 Otherwise, only through annulment of a marriage, which 
required a finding that a valid marriage never existed, could a person leave 
a spouse and remarry another.99 Jesus himself emphasizes the enduring 
nature of the marital commitment with the words, “what God has joined 
together, no man must separate.”100  And emphasizing the break from the 
Jewish tradition, he continued that “[f]or your hardness of heart, Moses 
allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so . . 
. [W]hoever divorces his wife . . . and marries another commits 
adultery.”101
Medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas offered both sacramental and 
naturalistic justifications for the indissolubility of marriage.  First, he 
argued that marriage is a sacrament through which a couple becomes part 
of the perpetual union of Christ and the Church.102  Their union, moreover, 
mirrors that union.  Thus marriage must similarly be an indissoluble 
union.  Second, Aquinas argued that nature intended marriage to be 
“oriented to the nurture of offspring . . . [S]ince offspring are the good of 
both husband and wife together, the latter’s union must remain 
permanently, according to the dictate of the law of nature.”103
Later canon law permitted both husbands and wives to seek legal 
separation (divorce from bed and board, or a mensa et thoro), but 
continued to prohibit complete divorce.104  Church courts granted legal 
separations in cases of adultery, desertion, or cruelty.105
3. The Natural Law Tradition
English family law’s historical and ideological origins can be traced 
directly to natural law principles, as “revealed” by Biblical teaching, 
including, of course, the Biblical teaching described in the previous two 
Sections.  Natural law theories, as conceived from the Medieval period 
through the Reformation,106 essentially asserted the existence of objective 
98
 19 Matthew 9; GIES & GIES, supra note 66, at 38.
99
 Note that Judaism after Christianity evolved such that its views divorce 
and practice with regard to monogamy came to closely match those of 
Christianity.  See Pereyre & Heymann, supra note 72, at 178-79.  MIELZINER, 
supra note 74, at x.
100
 19 Matthew 6-9.
101
 19 Matthew 6-9.
102 THEODORE MACKIN, MARRIAGE IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH:  DIVORCE 
AND REMARRIAGE 342 (1984) (discussing Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the 
Sentences).
103 Id. (quoting Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences).
104 WITTE, supra note 66, at 36.
105 WITTE, supra note 66, at 65.
106
 One may trace natural law positions, of course, to the classical Greek and
Roman writers, including the Stoics, Plato, and Cicero.  See BRIAN BIX, 
JURISPRUDENCE, THEORY AND CONTENT 66-67 (3d ed. 2004).  Important aspects 
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moral principles imposed by a divine creator and (more or less) 
discoverable by reason.107  In his seminal COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND, William Blackstone finds in natural law principles 
coherence in the disparate judicial opinions that constituted English 
common law.108  Blackstone is important, not because he was an 
especially innovative legal theorist – he wasn’t – but because so many 
early U.S. lawyers and lawmakers closely studied his writings.109  In the 
Introduction to the COMMENTARIES, Blackstone links the core principles 
of English common law to divinely-inspired Biblical scripture.  Under this 
view, God has set down certain immutable laws of nature, which may be 
discovered by humans and must not be contravened.110  Human faculties 
of reason (imperfect ever since Adam’s transgression in the Garden of 
Eden) are alone not up to the task of uncovering these truths.  But “Divine 
Providence”, through the holy scriptures, has intervened and revealed 
God’s law.111
Early American lawmakers struggled to accommodate both their 
religious convictions, which mandated certain family practices, and their 
commitment to establishing a country that respected religious liberty.  
Principles of natural law helped them mediate these tensions by allowing 
them to incorporate their religious beliefs into law under theism, detached 
from any single denomination or theology.
4. Its Influence on U.S. Family Law
a. The Mechanics
The Christian religion ascended and triumphed throughout Europe by 
the fourth century, with the Roman Catholic Church becoming history’s 
first great religious organization.112  The Church’s efforts to bring broader 
marital behavior under ecclesiastical administration and the canon law 
took centuries.113  Having accomplished this, the Church then had to 
of the theory change, however, with the early Church writers.  Id.  It is their 
conception of natural law that most directly influenced the Western tradition and 
U.S. law.
107 M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD’S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 90-110 
(7th ed., 2001).
108 BLACKSTONE, supra note 65.
109
  As one commentator has noted, “All of our formative documents – the 
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Federalist Papers, and the 
seminal decisions of the Supreme Court under John Marshall – were drafted by 
attorneys steeped in Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England.’”  ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 
11 (1984).
110 See supra note 65.
111 Id.
112 GIES & GIES, supra note 66, at 36-37.
113 COTT, supra note 87, at 5.
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grapple for a few more centuries with English and Continental monarchs.  
Reformers protested the Church’s jurisdiction over marriage and its 
enforcement of canon law.  In the sixteenth century, monarchs 
successfully wrested from the Catholic Church this control,114 and 
Protestant theology helped justify the adoption of civil (as opposed to 
purely religious) marriage statutes.115  The Protestant reformations 
differed somewhat theologically, but they all emphasized the importance 
of marriage to civil society, and the propriety of state and community 
involvement.116
At the same time, however, the monarchies – the English being the 
most relevant for our purposes – got exactly what they wrested, a Biblical 
Naturalist understanding of marriage and family law.  The reformers 
accepted and incorporated much of the traditional canon law; that law 
remained part of the common law of both Protestant and Catholic Europe 
into the late-eighteenth centuries.117  As a result, English marriage laws in 
the sixteenth century did not differ significantly from those of the 
medieval Catholic tradition.118
Seventeenth-century English theologians proffered the commonwealth 
model of marriage and the family to defend then-existing laws.  This 
model “helped to substantiate the traditional hierarchies of husband over 
wife, parent over child, church over household, [and] state over 
church”.119
British colonists brought to America with them then-prevailing British 
laws,120 and we thus find the roots of U.S. family law in early modern 
England.121  The English common law passed to and was largely accepted 
by early American civil authorities.  The congruence between citizens’ 
and the government’s views on marriage reinforced the influence of the 
Bible on this elemental part of early American family law:
114 Id. at 5.
115 WITTE, supra note 66, at 42-43.
116 WITTE, supra note 66, at 44-45.
117 Id. at 44.
118 Id. at 131.
119 Id. at 131.
120 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIED 
WOMEN UNDER THE STATUTES OF THE SEVERAL STATES AND AT COMMON LAW 
AND IN EQUITY, VOL. I [hereinafter BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF 
MARRIED WOMEN I], 1 (1873, reprint ed. 1987).  See also, JOEL PRENTISS 
BISHOP, BISHOP ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, WITH THE EVIDENCE, PRACTICE, 
PLEADINGS, AND FORMS; ALSO OF SEPARATIONS WITHOUT DIVORCE, AND OF 
THE EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE IN ALL ISSUES, VOL. I [hereinafter BISHOP ON 
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE I], 36 (5th ed., 1873).
121 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIED WOMEN, supra note 
65, at 1.  Bishop observed that “the law of married women came originally to us 
from England with the general mass.”  Id.
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The Christian religious background of marriage was 
unquestionably present and prominent.  It was adopted in and 
filtered through legislation.  For Americans who envisioned 
marriage as a religious ceremony and commitment, the institution 
was no less politically formed and freighted; yet they were unlikely 
to object to secular oversight when both the national and the state 
governments aligned marriage policies with Christian tenets.122
b. The Concept of Conjugality
Biblical naturalism thus shaped early Western concepts of family law, 
including that of conjugality.  And the conjugal concept found its most 
significant expression in early U.S. family laws implementing the 
Biblically-derived unity of husband and wife123  Early family law rules –
like the New Testament—declared the marital couple a single unit, headed 
by the husband.  That unity took legal form in the doctrine of coverture, in 
which the wife’s legal personhood became subsumed into her 
husband’s.124  Wives ceased to exist as separate legal entities and were 
unable to execute legal documents or own assets without their husbands’ 
cooperation.125
Other aspects of Biblical tradition that were present in early American 
law included the importance of free consent for the creation of a valid 
marriage, and the (theoretically) indissolubility of marriage. While the 
latter reinforced the importance of conjugality, the former foreshadowed 
the increasing importance of the concept of contract in family law.
In many important respects, aspects of the principle of Biblical 
naturalism and the concept of conjugality both continue to be embodied in 
and effectuated by U.S. family laws.  Its rules define and carefully 
circumscribe membership in marriage and the marital family; establish 
unalterable terms governing the intact marriage, viewing the conjugal 
couple in many respects as a single unit;126 presume marriages to be 
enduring; and require state declaration for legal dissolution.  And state 
122 COTT, supra note 87, at 9.
123 Id. at 10.
124 See NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW:  WOMEN, MARRIAGE, 
AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 158-59 (1982); COTT, 
supra note 87, at 10-12.
125 COTT, supra note 87, at 11-12.  When a man and woman married,
[T]he common law turned the married pair legally into one person—the 
husband . . . This legal doctrine of marital unity was called coverture . . . 
Coverture in its strictest sense meant that a wife could not use legal avenues 
such as suits or contracts, own assets, or execute legal documents without 
her husband’s collaboration . . . And the husband became the political as 
well as the legal representative of his wife, disenfranchising her.
Id.
126 See supra note 24.
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restrictions on consensual non-marital and extra-marital sexual activities 
persist, despite the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas.127
The continued vitality of the concept of conjugality is evident, 
moreover, in the widely perceived moral superiority of the marital family 
as the “natural” and optimal family form.  Recent events and policies 
reflect these views.  When it enacted the 1996 Welfare Act, for example, 
the federal government explicitly identified marriage formation as one of 
the goals of the statute.128  States are increasingly adopting such programs, 
aimed both at their poor as well as their general populations.  The Defense 
of Marriage Act, the proposed Federal Marriage Amendment, and 
proliferating state constitutional amendments restricting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples all seek to all seek to reinforce traditional 
conjugality.129  Because much opposition to homosexual marriage stems 
from beliefs with origins in Biblical naturalism,130 these notable examples 
127 See supra note 25.
128
 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-19 (2000).
129
 The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) ensures that same-sex couples 
receive no federal spousal benefits by defining “spouse” and “marriage” to 
include only the union of a man and woman.  28 U.S.C. § 1738(c) (Supp, 1998).  
It also declares that the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause (ART. IV, §1) 
does not require states to recognize same-sex marriages formalized in other 
states.  28 U.S.C. § 1738(c).  The Federal Marriage Amendment states: 
“Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a 
woman.  Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be 
construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred 
upon any union other than the union of a man and a woman.”  H.R.J. Res. 39, 
109th Cong. (2005).  To date, thirty-eight states have statutes or constitutional 
amendments restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples.  See 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/news/fact.html?record=1427 (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2006) (listing states with statutory or constitutional provisions).
130 See, e.g., John J. Coughlin, Natural Law, Marriage, and the Thought of 
Karol Wojtyla, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1771, 1774 (2001):
[T]he medieval canonists integrated various aspects of religious and secular 
thought to create a natural law theory of marriage.  The theory held that 
marriage was a permanent association between a man and women intended 
to nourish the bond of conjugal love and to enable the procreation and 
education of children.
Id. See also, Andrew Koppelman, The Decline and Fall of the Case Against 
Same-Sex Marriage, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 5 (2004); Michael J. Perry, 
Christians, the Bible and Same-Sex Unions:  An Argument for Political Self-
Restraint 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 449 (2001). But see, WILLIAM N. 
ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:  FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY 
TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 99-100 (1996) (noting that “[t]here is no univocal 
Judeo-Christian tradition against same-sex marriage” and presenting alternate 
interpretations of religious texts commonly cited as condemning homosexuality).
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may represent either lingering or renewed willingness to embrace legal 
rules whose justifications lie almost exclusively within that tradition.
The concept of conjugality supports (and has itself been reinforced by) 
another concept – that of familial privacy.  Early U.S. law (and much of 
contemporary U.S. law) viewed the conjugal couple as an impenetrable 
and indivisible unit.  The metaphor of unity, combined with the concept of 
the male’s individual rights as head of that unit, shielded the family from 
state interference.  The next Section briefly examines family privacy’s 
Biblical-natural roots.
c. The Concept of Privacy
Biblical naturalism also helped shape the concept of family privacy.  
Post-colonial notions of patriarchal authority over the home justified state 
noninterference in the family; such noninterference sought not to ensure 
individual autonomy and self-effectuation, but instead to enable the family 
to function as a distinct unit within society, under male authority. 131
Social practice obligated the male head of the family to run a well-ordered 
household; legal rules empowered him to do so by granting him control 
over its inhabitants, family property, and other resources.132  One 
seventeenth-century author expressed the common authoritarian view of 
parenting:  “[C]hildren’s wills and willfulness [must] be restrained and 
repressed . . . Children should not know, if it could be kept from them, that 
they have a will of their own, but in their parent’s keeping.”133
(Notably, the concept of familial privacy was simultaneously 
supported in the early U.S. by the principle of liberal individualism.  The 
next section discusses the nature of its influence, and how liberal-
individual ideas on this topic were adjusted to better correspond with 
Biblical-natural ideals.  It will also trace how the expansion of that 
principle shifted notions of privacy from the family to the individual.)
Biblical naturalism and the concepts that embody it have thus exerted 
great influence over the shape of family law as it existed in the early 
131
 Early Americans viewed the family as the unit entitled to privacy and 
freedom from state intervention.  Larry Peterman & Tiffany Jones, Defending 
Family Privacy, 5 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 74-76 (2003).  Peterman and Jones 
note that the early concept of familial privacy protected the family unit “so that 
members of the family could fulfill the responsibilities inhering in their particular 
roles.”  Id.
132 MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 5, 236-38 (1985).  Into 
the nineteenth century, fathers had exclusive and extensive rights over wives and 
their children, who were subordinate to and dependent on them.  See also supra 
notes 124-25, and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of coverture); note 24, 
and accompanying text (discussing other doctrines).
133
 Teitelbaum, supra note 40, at 1139 (quoting J. ROBINSON, OF CHILDREN 
AND THEIR EDUCATION (1628) (additional citations omitted)).
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states.  Early lawmakers shared the near-universal belief in a theistically 
ordained natural order, distinctly shaped by the Biblical tradition.  In many 
ways, however, its directives conflicted with those of a second principle to 
which the early U.S. was also committed – liberal individualism.  The 
ideal of liberal individualism, how it clashed with early Americans’ 
Biblical naturalistic beliefs, and the effects of these on our family law are 
the focus of the following Section.
B. LIBERAL INDIVIDUALISM AND ITS INFLUENCE ON U.S. FAMILY LAW
As it is with Biblical naturalism, that the principle of liberal 
individualism has helped shape U.S. family law is clear.134  Ideals of 
individual liberty were written into the country’s founding documents and 
are part of our cultural discourse.135  This Article argues that this is the 
second foundational principle of U.S. family law – like Biblical 
naturalism, it has heavily influenced the original shape and later 
development.  Its ideals have moved U.S. family law along two axes:  the 
first has extended guarantees of liberty to greater numbers and classes of 
individuals, including women and children; the second has increased the 
total quantum of liberty permitted each individual.  Changes in laws have 
sought to expand individual autonomy and facilitate self-determination, 
frequently at the expense of Biblical-natural ideals.
The next two sections describe the principle of liberal individualism 
and demonstrate its influence on concepts and practices of U.S. family 
law.
1. Liberal Individualism
The liberal theories articulated by John Locke significantly influenced 
American statesmen of the late eighteenth century,136 and his ideas have 
134 See Singer, supra note 31, at 1508-1517 (1992) (noting the importance on 
U.S. political and legal thought of individual autonomy and notions of privacy, 
but arguing that until recently, these concepts have been ascribed to the family 
unit, rather than the individual).  See generally, ROBERT BELLAH, ET AL., HABITS 
OF THE HEART:  INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985).
135 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1-2 (U.S. 1776); U.S. 
CONST. pmbl.  See also infra note 138 and accompanying text.
136 E.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE AND MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE 
CONSTITUTION 70-71 (1991) (“[O]ne of the most influential thinkers for 
American statesmen of the [late eighteenth century was] the seventeenth-century 
English political philosopher John Locke.”); Steven Kautz, Liberty, Justice, and 
the Rule of Law, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 435, 438, n.7. (1999) (“Classical 
liberalism is the view that liberty is the fundamental political good.  The 
authoritative statement of this view is JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT); Jeremy Waldron, Natural Rights in the Seventeenth and 
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been considered “the touchstone of all subsequent liberal thought.”137
Locke’s theory of liberal democracy espouses radical individualism138 and 
a concomitant theory of the negative, limited state.139  Thomas Paine’s 
Eighteenth Centuries, in NONSENSE UPON STILTS:  BENTHAM, BURKE AND 
MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN (Jeremy Waldron, ed., 1987) 7-25 (“[T]he 
argument set out in [Locke’s] Two Treatises of Government will serve us, as it 
served the revolutionaries of the eighteenth century, as the paradigm of a theory 
of natural rights.”); Bruce Kuklick, Seven Thinkers and How They Grew:  
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz; Locke, Berkeley, Hume; Kant, in PHILOSOPHY IN 
HISTORY 130 (Richard Rorty, et al., eds., 1984) (“[I]n the United States, [Locke] 
was the intellectual father of the Constitution.  He was ‘America’s philosopher’, 
‘the great and celebrated Mr. Locke’, whose claim on American affections dated 
from the Revolution.”).
137 BRIAN R. NELSON, WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT:  FROM SOCRATES TO 
THE AGE OF IDEOLOGY 208 (2d ed. 1996).  Other liberal thinkers who influenced 
early Americans included Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and 
Immanuel Kant.  Id.  Mary Ann Glendon points especially to Thomas Hobbes, 
especially as his ideas were expressed by the influential American jurist Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr.  MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN 
WESTERN LAW 119-25 (1987).  Hobbes’s writings influenced Locke; however, 
Locke’s conception of the natural state as one of liberty triumphed over the 
Hobbesian view of the state of nature as a state of war.  See NELSON, supra, at 
233-34.
138
 In his Second Treatise, Locke writes that “[m]an being born . . . with a 
title to perfect freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and 
privileges of the law of Nature, equally with any other man . . . have by nature a 
power . . . to preserve his property—that is, his life, liberty, and estate, against 
the injuries and attempts of other men”.  JOHN LOCKE, The Second Treatise of 
Government, IN TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT Bk. II, cap. 7 (Peter Laslett, 
ed. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press 1965) (1689)).
139 NELSON, supra note 137, at 193-95.  Locke emphasized the primacy of 
individual rights and liberties, and viewed the function of government to be 
limited to safeguarding those liberties from intrusion.  He writes that
A man, . . . having, in the state of Nature, no arbitrary power over the life, 
liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the law of Nature 
gave him for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, this is all 
he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and by it to the legislative 
power, so that the legislative can have no more than this . . . It is a power 
that hath no other end but preservation”.
LOCKE, supra note 138, at cap. 11.
There has been some debate as to whether the dominant political tradition in 
the fledgling U.S. was republicanism or the classical liberalism perhaps best 
articulated by John Locke.  See Mark V. Tushnet, Book Review, A Conservative 
Defense of Liberal Constitutional Law, 100 HARV. L. REV. 423, 425 (1986)
(reviewing ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (1985)).  The traditions differ in their conceptions of individual liberty:  in 
the republican ideal, liberty is the absence of domination; in the Lockean ideal, 
liberty is the absence of interference.  See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM:  A 
THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 41 (1997).  In the republican view, 
“[T]he kindly master does deprive subjects of their freedom, dominating them 
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Common Sense, a highly influential 1776 pamphlet that stated the case for 
American independence, echoes Locke’s theory of limited government as 
one charged with the protection of certain fundamental rights; these 
included life, liberty, and property.140  Other statesmen, including 
Alexander Hamilton and James Otis, explicitly refer in their writings to 
the importance of Locke’s theories.141  While many early Americans 
undoubtedly learned only second-hand Lockean liberal ideals (dissociated, 
perhaps, even from his name), those ideals nonetheless predominated.  As 
one political theorist argues:
The American Revolution was carried out, if only indirectly, in the 
name of Lockean ideals.  The Declaration of Independence . . 
without actually interfering.  The well-ordered law does not deprive subjects of 
their freedom, interfering with those subjects but not dominating them.”  Id.
There appears to be general consensus, however, that Lockean liberal 
individualism prevailed as the dominant political philosophy, and the notion of 
freedom as non-interference superceded the notion of freedom as non-
domination.  See id., at 41.  Pettit argues that the republican ideal was gradually 
replaced by the liberal, non-interference ideal.  Id. at 12, 35-50.
Until the latter half of the twentieth century, historians accepted that the 
“American political tradition was unequivocally Lockean.”  Id. (citing as the 
classic articulation of this view the discussion in L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL 
TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955)).  Other historians have argued that, at least 
during the period leading up to the framing of the Constitution (and perhaps for 
some time thereafter), the predominant political philosophy was republican.  See, 
e.g., G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA:  THE FEDERALIST (1981); GORDON S. 
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC:  1776-1787 (1969).  This 
view, however, has not gained universal acceptance.  See, e.g., J. DIGGINS, THE 
LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1984).
140 THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE:  ON THE ORIGIN AND DESIGN OF 
GOVERNMENT IN GENERAL, WITH CONCISE REMARKS ON THE ENGLISH 
CONSTITUTION (1776) (“Society is produced by our wants, and government by 
our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our 
affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices . . . Government, even in 
its best state, is but a necessary evil”.), reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
FREEDOM:  IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 171-79 (Samuel B. 
Rudolph, ed. 1993).  See also, J.S. MCLELLAND, A HISTORY OF WESTERN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT (1996); THE PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM, supra at 87.  
McLelland notes that:
According to the testimony of contemporaries, Paine’s pamphlet had a 
remarkable effect on the minds of Americans in the year 1776 when even 
the most rebellious Americans were still wavering about the crucial step of 
declaring independence.  George Washington himself is supposed to have 
been finally converted to independence by reading Paine.
Id.
141
 Alexander Hamilton, Response to “Farmer”, in THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, VOL. 1 (Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke, eds, 
Columbia University Press 1961); James Otis, Of the Natural Rights of Colonists, 
reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM:  IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS 129-31 (Samuel B. Rudolph, ed. 1993).
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.speaks the language of natural rights . . . Locke’s economic and 
social theories have by now become an American ideology.  His 
emphasis upon the importance of . . . individual rights has been 
profoundly influential in this country.”142
Also profoundly influential in the eighteenth century was the principle 
of Biblical naturalism.  It too shaped political thought and legal practice, 
and early Americans sought to reconcile the two principles and 
accommodate both in law.  Locke himself provides a striking example.
Locke hewed to a view of natural law that grounded his theory of 
rights and equality.143  And the ideas expounded in his Two Treatises are, 
according to commentator John Dunn, “saturated with Christian 
assumptions”.144  Locke took the general subordination of women as 
evidence of its natural ordination.  As did many early Americans, he 
viewed entry into marriage as properly governed by the liberal concept of 
contract, describing it as a “voluntary Compact between Man and 
Woman”.145  Locke nonetheless did not extend his notion of equality to 
women within marriages, reasoning that when husband and wife disagree, 
it becomes “necessary, that the last Determination, i.e., the Rule, should be 
placed somewhere, [and] it naturally falls to the Man’s share, as the abler 
and the stronger.”146
Thus Locke, who convincingly argued for the safeguarding of 
individual liberty, was at the same time strongly constrained and deeply 
conflicted by Biblical tenets that reinforced the moral rectitude of the 
“natural” patriarchal family.  After attempting in vain to reconcile Locke’s 
position on women’s subjection with his theories of basic human liberty 
and equality, Jeremy Waldron concludes:
Locke’s position on the natural subjection of wives is an embarrassment 
for his general theory of equality . . . Bible and nature are cited for the 
142 NELSON, supra note 137, at 212.
143 LOCKE, supra note 138, at 311.  “The State of Nature has a Law of Nature 
to govern it, which obliges every one:  and Reason, which is that Law, teaches all 
Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one 
ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions.”  Id.  His was 
a view widely held by Americans.  See, e.g, THE PHILOSOPHY OF FREEDOM:  
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 84-85 (Samuel B. Rudolph, ed. 
1993) (“The early Americans talked a good deal about what we would today 
refer to as natural law . . . The laws of God and nature [ ] afford an equality of 
liberty for all”.).
144 JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE:  AN HISTORICAL 
ACCOUNT OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 99 
(1969).  Dunn writes that “Jesus Christ (and Saint Paul) may not appear in person 
in the text of the Two Treatises but their presence can hardly be missed when we 
come upon the normative creaturely equality of all men in virtue of their shared 
species-membership.”  Id.
145 LOCKE, supra note 138, at 82.
146 Id.
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proposition that women are men’s inferiors; and Bible and nature are 
cited for the proposition that women and men are one another’s equals . . 
. [H]ere is a philosopher struggling not altogether successfully to free his 
own thought as well as the thought of his contemporaries from the idea 
that something as striking as the difference between the sexes must count 
in itself as a refutation of basic equality”.147
The difficulties of accommodating in public policy both the ideal of 
liberal individualism and Biblical natural views of family were evident in 
early political debates.  Delegates to the 1853 Massachusetts constitutional 
convention, for example, viewed as critical the need to safeguard 
individual rights through democratic political representation.148  One 
delegate noted that, “[I]n order to secure the rights of these families –
these units, including all the individuals in them . . . each family must be 
represented.”149  But, he rationalized, the male head of household must be 
that sole representative because the differences among the sexes was 
natural and ordained by God.
This Article does not suggest that early American lawmakers were 
intimately familiar with and/or influenced by all aspects of Lockean 
thought.  Nor does it minimize the likely influence of other political 
theorists.  Yet as a political philosophy, liberalism was foundational.  Its 
ideas informed early Americans’ thinking and writings; the latter were 
distributed and widely read.  The tension between ideals of liberty and 
equality and the realities of social inequalities was one with which Locke 
himself grappled, largely unsuccessfully.  Over the next two centuries, 
many of the changes in U.S. family laws sought to more closely align 
social practice with liberal ideals.
The next section turns to the influence of liberal individualism on U.S. 
family law and practice.
2. Its Influence on U.S. Family Law
147 JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY:  CHRISTIAN 
FOUNDATIONS OF JOHN LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 40 (2002) [emphasis in 
original] (discussing the Two Treatises and JOHN LOCKE, THE REASONABLENESS 
OF CHRISTIANITY, AS DELIVERED IN THE SCRIPTURES (Bristol:  Thoemmes Press, 
1997).
148
 Jacob Katz Cogan, Note, The Look Within:  Property, Capacity, and 
Suffrage in Nineteenth-Century America, 107 YALE L.J. 473, 485 (1997), citing 1 
Official Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the State Convention, 
Assembled May 4, 1853, To Revise and Amend the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts 747 (Boston, White & Potter 1853) 
[hereinafter Massachusetts Convention of 1853] (statement of Abijah Marvin).
149 Id., at 485, citing Massachusetts Convention of 1853 at 747 (statement of 
Abijah Marvin).  Another delegate argued that a family could “have but one will; 
and the man, who, by nature, is placed at the head of that government, is the only 
authorized exponent of that will.”  Massachusetts Convention of 1853 at 598 
(statement of George Boutwell).
PRINCIPLES OF U.S. FAMILY LAW
32
The principle of liberal individualism has guided the direction of U.S. 
family law.  Many developments in family laws reflect its direct influence.  
To give just a few examples, rules have:  restored legal capacity and 
citizenship to married women;150 eased restrictions on divorce;151 and 
relaxed legal constraints on sexual and intimate conduct generally.152
Liberal ideals have also expanded society’s willingness to view children, 
not exclusively or even primarily as subordinate to parental authority, but 
as individuals in their own right.153
Liberal individualism is also embodied in the following concepts:  
freedom from state interference, or privacy; freedom to enter into 
contracts; and, through the concept of parens patriae, the freedom (usually 
of children) from harm imposed by others.  The next Sections detail the 
manner in which these important concepts in our family law embody the 
liberal individual principle.
a. The Concept of Privacy
The principles of Biblical naturalism and liberal individualism together 
gave shape to and were reflected in the early concept of familial privacy.  
Biblical naturalism grounded the concept in patriarchal norms, and these 
were embodied in rules that reinforced paternal authority.154  But liberal 
individualism also figured in the concept.  And in liberal rhetoric, family 
privacy protected from undue state interference the individual rights of the 
husband/father as the head and public representative of his family.155
Early law uneasily reconciled ideals of liberty and equality with the 
social reality of inequality by identifying white, male property-owners as 
those individuals uniquely entitled to full citizenship and its attendant 
rights.156  A man’s liberty included control over his property and 
150 See supra note 124, and accompanying text.
151 See supra note 24, and accompanying text.
152 See supra note 25, and accompanying text.
153 See Michael D.A. Freeman, Taking Children’s Rights More Seriously, in 
CHILDREN, RIGHTS AND THE LAW 52-71 (Alston, et al., eds. 1992).
154 See supra notes 131-33, and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 143-49, and accompanying text.
156
 A married man became the political and legal representative of his wife, 
and assumed her property – “[h]e became the one full citizen in the household,
his authority over and responsibility for his dependents contributing to his 
citizenship capacity.”  COTT, supra note 87, at 11-12 (2000).  See also, CHILTON 
WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-
1860 (1960); MARCHETTE CHUTE, THE FIRST LIBERTY:  A HISTORY OF THE 
RIGHT TO VOTE IN AMERICA, 1619-1850 (1969); NELSON, supra note 137, at
193-95.  Nelson notes that Locke considered women “citizens” who were 
nonetheless excluded from full citizenship on the basis of paternal/patriarchal 
power (which he rejected as a legitimate form of political authority).  According 
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household.157  The state respected that liberty and hence accorded the 
family privacy, intervening only minimally.  The tradition of state non-
interference in the family gave a man near-absolute control over his home 
and the individuals in it – it was his own “little commonwealth.”158  This 
carefully-circumscribed conception of liberal individualism helped secure 
men’s individual rights while simultaneously respecting Biblical-natural 
norms dictating paternal authority over the family.159
Society’s stated liberal ideals were plainly inconsistent with the 
legal incapacities and social inequalities of certain classes of people, 
including women and enslaved people.  Gradually, other individuals 
within the household – women, children, and slaves gained full (or near-
full) formal legal personhood, entitling them to share the rights previously 
enjoyed only by certain men.160  Women gradually gained formal equality 
and marriage officially became a relationship between equals.161  The 
presence in the household of additional full citizens thus weakened the 
concept of male-headed familial privacy, but by no means did it eradicate 
altogether the concept of family privacy.162
to Nelson, “[t]his was possible only on the assumption that the patriarchal family 
is natural, that it existed even in the state of nature, and that as a consequence 
women never possessed that property in either person or possessions that would 
have made them equal participants with men in the act of contracting.”  Id. at 
215.
157
 The husband’s control over the marital property was absolute, and his 
authority over both his wife and children were extensive.  See generally KATZ, 
supra note 8; GROSSBERG, supra note 132, at 5.
158 See JOHN DEMOS, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH:  FAMILY LIFE IN 
PLYMOUTH COLONY, p. x. (1970); GROSSBERG, supra note 132, at 4-5.
159
 Teitelbaum, supra note 40, at 1174-79 (explaining that the law’s emphasis 
on family privacy and autonomy reinforced male authority over the family).  See 
also, KATZ, supra note 8, at 131, citing Sanford N. Katz & William A. 
Schroeder, Disobeying a Father’s Voice:  A Comment on Commonwealth v. 
Brasher, 57 MASS. L.Q. 43 (1973).
160
 Within family law, the enactment of Married Women’s Property Acts 
restored to married women their legal personalities.  See BASCH, supra note 87.  
Other significant rights became incorporated in Amendments to the Constitution.  
For example, women gained the absolute right to vote in 1920.  U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIX.  The Fourteenth Amendment more broadly guarantees liberty and 
equal protection of the laws.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
161
 Ann Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1787, 1830 
(1995).
162 Id. at 1826-36.  Dailey notes that “[t]he expansion of individual rights 
within the domestic sphere, however, has not entirely eradicated the rhetoric of 
family privacy from legal discourse.  The doctrine of family privacy . . . 
continues to control the state’s ability to intervene in the parent-child 
relationship”.  Id. at 1830-31.
The privacy that once respected male authority, however, continued to exist, 
and shielded from public view domestic violence and subordination of physically 
and economically weaker wives, as well as physical abuse of children.  Thus 
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Family privacy – modified by gains in gender equality – remains 
especially robust in the area of parent-child relationships.163  Notions of 
privacy that earlier limited the state’s interference with a man’s absolute 
authority over his wife, children, and household became officially gender-
neutral.  Men no longer have formal power over their wives, but parents 
continue to have power over their children – “paternal authority” has 
become “parental authority”.  Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court in the early 
twentieth century explicitly grounded in principles of individual liberty a 
constitutionally-protected “parental right” in the care and control over 
one’s child.164  Family privacy thus respects “the liberty of parents and 
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
control.”165
In the twentieth century, the concept of privacy that had earlier 
protected the family shifted to protect the individual.  In 1973, the 
Supreme Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird extended the protections of privacy
– initially belonging to the marital family – to the individual.166  With this 
decision, the Court severed the theoretical link of privacy from its Biblical 
underpinnings and firmly anchored it exclusively in Constitutional ideals 
of individual liberty.  Privacy exists now as a fundamental right belonging 
to individuals.  The ideal of state noninterference in private decisions 
(procreative decisions,167 intimate sexual acts, 168 etc.) has been grounded 
in the Constitution’s Due Process Clauses, the 9th Amendment, and 
penumbra of various other amendments to the Constitution.  It is worth 
noting, however, that the concept of privacy itself may be ceding ground 
feminists have criticized the concept of privacy as one that has permitted the 
continued isolation and domination of women in homes.
163
 Lee Teitelbaum notes that “[t]he notion of family privacy or family 
autonomy is [   ] invoked regularly in connection with parent-child relations.”  
Teitelbaum, supra note 40, at 1146.
164
 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923).  DAVID J. HERRING, THE PUBLIC FAMILY:  EXPLORING ITS 
ROLE IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 139-58 (2003).  “Parental rights” include the 
presumptive right to the custody of the child; to decide the nature and duration of 
their children’s education; to leave their children in the care of another person for 
long periods of time and subsequently reclaim them; and to discipline the child, 
including corporal punishment or emotional manipulation.  Id. at 140.
165
 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534-35.  Ann Dailey notes that the 
Court has sought to justify parental rights (within a constitutional philosophy that 
places great emphasis on individual autonomy) by pointing to the unique role of 
parents in preparing their children for the responsibilities of citizenship.  Dailey, 
supra note 161, at 1832-33.
166
 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
167 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
168
 In Lawrence, the Court saw these laws as seeking to control, not merely a 
specific act, but more broadly “a personal relationship that . . . is within the 
liberty of persons to choose.”  S. Ct. 2472, 2478 (2003).
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to the broader notion of liberty (with its more explicit Constitutional 
grounding) as the justification for individual protections.169
b. The Concept of State as Parens Patriae
The principle of liberal individualism, counterintuitively perhaps, has 
helped to expand notions of children’s distinct personhood and shape the 
concept of parens patriae.  It has been the impetus behind, and provides 
justification for, extension of notions of full personhood to children as a 
class.  The past few decades have seen development in the area of 
children’s individual rights, but children’s rights have in many respects 
been viewed as secondary to parents’ rights.170
Critics of the parental rights doctrine have argued that it conflicts with 
liberal ideals – creating or expanding parental rights necessarily restricts 
the rights of children.  They argue that a strong conception of parental 
rights subjects children to the choices of another, subsumes their interests 
within those of their parents, and fails to recognize that children’s and 
parents’ interests can all-too-easily diverge.171  Parents’ rights include 
their ability to make choices for their children (religion, education, etc.) 
that can sharply limit their future abilities to choose their own life course.
To protect the individual rights of children, the state is increasingly 
willing to use the doctrine of parens patriae to intervene in even the intact 
family.172  Historically the state exercised its parens patriae power when 
no guardian was available to a child.173  That power has gradually 
expanded.  In the nineteenth century, state legislatures began enacting 
child abuse and neglect laws that authorized governmental intervention 
169 See Stenberg v. Carhart,, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) citing Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (discussing a 
woman’s liberty interests in choosing whether to bear a child).
170 See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.  See also, HERRING, supra 
note 164, at 139-58, Freeman, Taking Children’s Rights More Seriously, supra 
note 153, at 52-71.
171 See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987); Dailey, 
supra note 161, at 1831-33; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child:  
Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 
(1992).
172 HERRING, supra note 164, at 159.  Herring notes that, “[W]hile the 
rhetoric of parental rights comes under attack because of its negative effects on 
children and functioning family associations, the rhetoric of children’s rights 
grows more robust . . . In essence, society has used the rhetoric of children’s 
rights to justify government involvement in the family association.”  Id. (citations 
omitted).
173 See Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae:  History and Present Status of 
State Intervention into the Parent-Child Relationship ,in 1A CURRENT 
PERSPECTIVES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 109, 119 at
109-10, 116 (Sandra Anderson Garcia & Robert Batey eds, 1991).
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into abusive parent-child relationships.174  And today, laws give states 
even broader powers to protect children.175  States assert jurisdiction in the 
name of children’s best interest in actions before separate juvenile courts, 
as well as in custody and adoption actions (including, perhaps most 
notoriously, allegations of child abuse and neglect).176
The state’s interfering when necessary to safeguard the liberty of some 
(i.e., children) from harmful incursion by others (e.g., parents or 
guardians), is arguably the very embodiment of the Lockean ideals of 
government.
c. The Concept of Contract
An essential aspect of liberty is the freedom to contract.  Both liberal 
individualism and Biblical naturalism supported the concept of conjugality 
as a relationship entered into voluntarily.177  That women freely sought 
and accepted the protection of a spouse gave early Americans some cover 
for the internal inequalities of the marital relationship.178
The notion of indissoluble marriage clashed with liberal ideals.179
States drastically lowered barriers to divorce, in part reasoning that 
174 KATZ, supra note 8, at 131. See generally, SANFORD N. KATZ, MELBA 
MCGRATH & RUTH-ARLENE W. HOWE, CHILD NEGLECT LAWS IN AMERICA 
(American Bar Assn. Press, 1976).
175
 For a discussion of the current contours of the doctrine of parens patriae
in the U.S., see Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for 
the Twenty-First Century:  Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children’s 
Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381, 403-14 [hereinafter Clark, Parens Patriae 
and a Modest Proposal]. 
176 See Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal, supra note 175, at 403-
14, n. 17.
177 See Cogan, supra note 148, at 485.  One nineteenth-century writer noted 
that married women “conferred upon their husbands, by the marriage contract, all 
their civil rights:  not absolutely, . . . but on condition, that the husband will make 
use of his power to promote their happiness”.  Id., citing WILLIAM C. JARVIS, 
THE REPUBLICAN; OR, A SERIES OF ESSAYS ON THE PRINCIPLES AND POLICY OF 
FREE STATES, HAVING A PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA AND THE INDIVIDUAL STATES 66 (Pittsfield, Phineas Allen 1820).
178 See supra notes 145-46, and accompanying text.
179 ARLAND THORNTON, READING HISTORY SIDEWAYS:  THE FALLACY AND 
ENDURING IMPACT OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL PARADIGM ON FAMILY LIFE 168 
(2005).  Thornton argues the incompatibility of enforced lifelong marriage with 
Lockean liberal ideals:
That marriage was indissoluble had been a central [tenet] of the Catholic 
Church from about 1200 on.  With the Protestant Reformation came the 
acceptance of divorce, but only in very limited sets of circumstances.  
Marriage continued to be viewed legally, socially, and religiously as a 
lifetime commitment.  Clearly, Lockean principles were fundamentally at 
odds with the notion of indissoluble marriage.
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voluntariness was an essential aspect of the marital “contract”.  Initially, 
divorce proceedings permitted courts to inquire into details of the failed 
marriage; with the adoption of no-fault provisions in divorce statutes, the 
necessity of such inquiries has been drastically curtailed.  The state thus 
continues to oversee dissolution of the marital bond.  But the gradual 
relaxing of divorce laws means that the formal strictures of the marital 
status have ceded ground to individualism and the right to self-
determination.  The conjugal unit is sufficiently important that state 
doesn’t want it severed lightly; but the countervailing principle of liberal 
individualism also requires that state not stand in the way of its citizens’ 
desire for freedom and self-determination.
Couples have limited freedom to alter by contract some of the default 
rules that govern the terms of their marriage, because strong conjugal 
norms sharply circumscribe this ability.180  They have more freedom, 
however, to alter by contract the financial consequences attendant to the 
dissolution of their marriage.181  Even these contracts, however, are 
frequently closely examined by courts to ensure that their enforcement 
would not offend public policy.182
III. EVALUATING THE PRINCIPLES
“[A] commitment to the revisability of all beliefs is (if anything is) the 
hallmark of the pragmatic attitude.”183
This Article tackles the first part of a larger project – development of a 
normative jurisprudence of U.S. family law.  This larger project comprises 
three sequential parts:  First, it requires a conceptual analysis of the social 
and legal practices that govern families.  Parts I and II have done this.  The 
goal of this type of analysis is to expose the structure of family law.  
Understanding its structure helps us think more clearly about what U.S. 
family law is, in order better to subject that is to analysis.184  Second, the 
larger project requires critical or evaluative analysis of family law – a task 
Id.
180 See supra notes 43-44, and accompanying text (discussing Uniform 
Premarital Agreement Act and states’ treatment of premarital agreements 
generally).
181 See id.
182 See, supra notes 43-45, and accompanying text.  See also, e.g., WIS. 
STAT. § 767.255(3) ([N]o such [premarital] agreement shall be binding where the 
terms of the agreement are inequitable as to either party.”).  See also, PRINCIPLES 
OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 7.08 (2002) (seeking to systematize 
heightened judicial scrutiny of premarital agreements).  The Uniform Premarital 
Agreement Act treats premarital agreements more like commercial contracts, 
although approximately one-third of the states have altered its terms to require 
heightened scrutiny.
183 COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 8 [emphasis in original].
184 See COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 12.
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made more manageable through our deepened understanding of its 
structure.  This Part undertakes that task, examining family law’s most 
significant rules as expressions of interrelated concepts and underlying 
principles.  The third and final part of the project will offer a normative 
jurisprudence of U.S. family law that will better reflect contemporary 
social values and whose outcomes will better meet contemporary social 
needs.  That difficult and important task must be the focus of future work.
This Article turns now to the focus of this part – evaluating family law 
as the expression of its principles.  This evaluation asks whether its 
principles are satisfactory, or as reasonably satisfactory as can be 
expected.  This Article suggests one way to approach this difficult 
question.  If we cannot answer yes to it – and the next two sections 
conclude that we cannot – then we must undertake the final step of 
revising them.
To objectively evaluate the principles is, to say the least, difficult.  By 
shaping our family laws and social experience, the principles have 
themselves affected, if not largely determined, many of our beliefs and 
values about families.  The challenge, then, is to avoid evaluating the 
principles merely by reference to our moral sensibilities, as shaped by the 
principles themselves.  That would, of course, be a circular and pointless 
exercise.  To avoid that outcome, we can focus on the principles 
exclusively as they figure in family law,185 yet allow our broader range of 
understanding and experience enter into and inform our evaluation.  That 
broader experience, by incorporating a full range of principles (and 
hierarchies of principles), helps ensure that we do not merely examine the 
principles by reference to themselves or in an analytical vacuum.
Good or useful principles, this Article posits, would share at least the 
following attributes:  First, they would function well.  In other words, their 
expression in law and practice would further a set of social goals we 
identify as useful and productive (e.g., provision of care for society’s 
dependent members), while avoiding, as much as possible, outcomes that 
we determine to be harmful and destructive (e.g., impoverishment of those 
members).  And second, they would work in concert with a full hierarchy 
of principles from other legal and social contexts that, through our broader 
social experience, we have come to embrace.
The next Section evaluates each principle separately, examining its 
inherent attractiveness as well as its practical effect.  The final one 
evaluates them jointly, examining their combined effect on our family 
laws.
185
 The principles figure in other aspects of U.S. law and practice; but their 
desirability as underlying principles in other contexts does not concern us here.  
Certain principles may properly be foundational in one context but inappropriate 
in another.  This Article thus examines their desirability as they apply to the law 
of families.
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A. THE PRINCIPLES, INDIVIDUALLY
It is unsurprising that Biblical naturalism and liberal individualism 
have become the dual foundations of U.S. family law.  The conjugal 
family form fulfills many opposite-sex couples, and at its best provides a 
stable environment for procreation and childrearing.  And most people 
highly value their autonomy and the safeguards that permit self-
determination.  But a marriage dissolution rate that nears fifty percent and 
steadily-increasing numbers of nonmarital families should convincingly 
demonstrate that traditional lifelong conjugality cannot work for everyone 
– or even, perhaps, for the majority of us.  And while many of us enjoy 
significant freedom from state interference, many others find themselves 
without social connection or the social supports that would enable true 
exercise and enjoyment of liberty.  So what precisely is wrong with our 
principles?  Let’s turn first to Biblical naturalism.
From Biblical naturalism we derive concepts of conjugality and family 
privacy.  These concepts help define the normative family.  The grounding 
of the normative family in Biblical tradition lends divine sanction and 
purported moral superiority to that family form, even today.  And that 
normative vision has in turn been expressed most significantly in our laws 
of marriage and parenting.  The principle is thus actualized by family laws 
that provide societal support and reinforcement to that family form, 
privileging it.186
So how do this principle and the laws that express it function?  Again, 
legal and social practice reinforce and privilege the marital family.  That 
family form aims to provide individual fulfillment (through shared love 
and commitment) and the publicly-useful work of mutual support and 
dependent caretaking.  But privileging some families necessarily means 
not privileging others.  Thus nonmarital families – even those whose 
members perform some of the same valuable societal functions (e.g.,
mutual support, dependent caretaking, and child-raising) as those 
performed by the members of the marital nuclear family – receive less 
public support.
Most would agree that (because of shared commitments to another 
principle – the right to treatment as equals187) unequal treatment should 
exist only with justification.  In order to justify conjugal privileging, it 
should be demonstrated that – at a minimum – the marital family performs 
some useful societal function that other groupings fail to perform.  This 
186 See supra notes 20 and 56, and accompanying text.  For additional 
discussions of the mechanisms through which marital nuclear families have 
received public support throughout U.S. history, see STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE 
WAY WE NEVER WERE:  AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 680-
91 (1992); Martha Fineman, Masking Dependency:  The Political Role of Family 
Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2205-06 (1995).
187 See DWORKIN, supra note _____ at 272-75.
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cannot easily be demonstrated.  Indeed, while marriage may provide 
individual fulfillment to some,188 the socially useful functions which it 
performs – mutual support and dependent caretaking – can be and are 
similarly performed (albeit currently with less social support) by other 
family groupings.189  But the power of the conjugal norm is such that even 
when empirical evidence shows that, in nonconforming relationships, care 
between adult partners and success of childrearing virtually mirror that of 
the traditional relationship,190 the nonconforming ones continue to be 
viewed as less moral (at best).
An evaluation of the Biblical-natural principle should also examine 
whether it (again, as expressed through practice) is consistent with the 
other principle of family law, and the broader hierarchy of principles that
we espouse. 
Biblical-natural concepts of conjugality and family privacy espouse 
commitment and unity – laudable goals.  But importantly, Biblical 
naturalism irrevocably ties these values to a single family form – the 
opposite-sex, formally married couple and their children (or at least, their 
procreative potential).  This is its fundamental flaw.  It has led to rules in 
U.S. family law that elevate family form over family function.  The 
reification of a single family form obscures consideration and support of 
societal functions performed by nonconforming families.191  It provides 
188
 In that personal fulfillment through entry into marriage is a good, it is
arguably an individual, private good.  The sense in which marriage is 
individually fulfilling and desirable (at least partly) due to the public approbation 
and support it brings merely emphasizes the need to justify the exclusion of 
nonconforming groupings from participation.  For an elaboration of the argument 
that marriage’s expressive, companionate, and procreative functions are private 
goods best left to private ordering but that support and dependant caretaking are 
public functions that should receive public support regardless of family form, see 
generally, Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 307 (2004).
189
 One result is the continued success of the marital family relative to 
nonmarital families.  Hence the Biblical- naturalistic compulsion is perpetuated, 
and the continued relative success of the is helps justify and perpetuate the ought.
190 See Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual 
Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 159 (2001).
191
 Indeed, society’s refusal to permit nonmarital families the same abilities 
undermines their ability to perform socially useful functions.  In many gay 
families, only one member may legally adopt a child being raised by both.  The 
other member risks losing all rights to and authority over the child should the 
couple’s relationship fail (a protection afforded both natural and adoptive 
parents), and the child risks losing benefits derived from its relationship with the 
non-adoptive parent.  See, e.g., HERRING, supra note 164, at 156-57; Devjani 
Mishra, The Road to Concord:  Resolving the Conflict of Law Over Adoption by 
Gays and Lesbians, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS 91 (1996).
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unsatisfactory justifications for withholding from those families public 
benefits afforded the conjugal family.192
Lawmaking whose aim is to preserve or promote the conjugal family 
thus fails to further the social goals of a changing and pluralistic society in 
many ways.  First, lifelong marriage will not be a reality for most families.  
Second, encouraging couples to procreate to ensure the continued survival 
or well-being of society is not the imperative it was in the days of the Old 
Testament – to the contrary.  And Biblical naturalism leads to some 
socially harmful outcomes, as it results in the unequal treatment of 
significant members of society.
Lawmaking in this tradition imposes conformity with a normative 
family form with inadequate justification.  To state the obvious, we are a 
pluralistic society whose members do not all espouse the Judeo-Christian 
tradition and the moral values it includes.
Indeed, the dominance of the majority will (manifested by social and 
legal preferences for the Biblical-natural normative family) that grants 
lesser liberty to a nonconforming minority represents just the sort of 
conformity against which the principle of liberal individualism ultimately 
rails.  Let’s turn now to it.
On the positive side of the ledger, liberal individualism aims to 
promote autonomy and resists majority efforts to impose conformity.  The 
principle has historically been invoked to increase the liberty of 
individuals within the conjugal family.  It has guided society’s increasing 
respect of the liberty and equal treatment of both women and children.193
It is now being invoked by those who seek to increase the liberty of 
individuals outside of the conjugal family (i.e., those families that don’t 
conform to the traditional marital norm – including same-sex families) and 
are thus denied its benefits.
But acceptance of liberal individualism as an ideal is neither universal 
nor unequivocal.  Theorists have critiqued its adoption a political goal.  As 
early as the nineteenth century, De Tocqueville argued that liberal 
individualism emphasizes self-interest at the expense of community life.  
The liberal individual “exists but in himself and for himself . . . [A]s for 
the rest of his fellow citizens, he is close to them, but he sees them not”.194
192 See generally, Hamilton, supra note 188.
193 See supra notes 160-62 (discussing expansion of women’s rights), 170-76 
(discussing expansion of children’s rights) and accompanying text.
194 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, THE OLD REGIME AND THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTION p. xiii. (Stuart Gilbert trans., Doubleday 1955).  De Tocqueville 
argued that liberal society required a large and powerful central government, 
which was necessary to ensure maximum and equal liberty to all.  The combined 
effect of individualism and bureaucratic despotism was that “people are far too 
much disposed to think exclusively of their own interests, to become self-seekers 
practicing a narrow individualism and caring nothing for the public good.  Id.
For de Tocqueville’s prescient critique of liberal democracy generally, see I 
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Liberal individualism’s contemporary critics echo the theme.  They argue 
that its conceptions of autonomy and self-determination protected by legal 
rights foster individual pursuit of self-interest, detached from 
consideration for others.  Indeed, the focus on individual rights elides civic 
responsibility and destroys social cohesion.195
The flaws of liberal individualism as a founding principle of family 
law become evident as one examines how, if operating alone, it would find 
expression in family rules.  Within families, dependency and co-
dependency are virtually inevitable and can constrain individual 
fulfillment.  Imposing on individuals obligations towards others finds 
scant support in a liberal-individual theory.196
Martha Fineman has further criticized as a fictional construct the 
concept of the autonomous individual itself.197  Fineman points out that at 
some point in life, every individual is dependent on others, and even 
individuals who appear to be “autonomous” are in many ways supported 
by others (e.g., the “autonomous” adult male whose market or public 
activities are made possible by the at-home support of a woman and 
family association).198  Fineman argues, the concept of the private 
family—a unit entitled to both protection from the state and freedom from 
state intervention—assumes away universal dependency.  So while liberal 
democratic society purports to rest on the autonomous individual, in fact it 
is the family association that is its supporting unit.
In this case, family law’s principles do work in concert to achieve the 
socially desirable goal of mutual support.  But there are many examples 
where the principles together effect, not coherence, but dissonance.  The 
next section illustrates this.
B. THE PRINCIPLES, WORKING TOGETHER
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 202 (Francis Bowen, ed., 
Phillips Bradley, trans, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1945).
195 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK (1991); MARTHA MINOW, 
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND 
THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE 
AND POLITICS (1975); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1 (1988). But see, e.g., Linda C. McClain, “Atomistic Man” Revisited:  
Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171 
(1992) (arguing that contemporary legal liberal theory, as expounded by Ronald 
Dworkin and John Rawls, cannot be reduced to the view of the atomistic 
individual, but instead, supports social connection).
196 See, GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, supra note 195, at 76-108.  See generally, 
supra note 195, and accompanying text.
197
 Martha Fineman, Masking Dependency:  The Political Role of Family 
Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181 (1995).
198 Id. at 2200.  See also, MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED 
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 
145 (1995).
PRINCIPLES OF U.S. FAMILY LAW
43
The existence in a field of law of principles in tension with each other 
is not inherently objectionable.199  To the contrary, such tension can lead 
to productive compromise.  And sometimes, in the case of Biblical 
naturalism and liberal individualism in family law, it does.  For instance, 
liberal ideals have operated to relax some of the more oppressive aspects 
of the traditional conjugal relationship, expanding the liberties of women 
and children and lowering barriers to individuals wishing to exit broken 
relationships.  It thus enables marriage (which originated as a patriarchal 
and oppressive institution) to evolve and thus continue to exist and 
perform socially useful support and child-raising functions.200  But in 
other significant respects, the foundational principles that undergird our 
family law are irreconcilable.  Together, they too-often produce not 
productive compromise but incoherence and discord.  The most significant 
examples follow, beginning with membership in the gravitational center 
around which family law revolves – the marital, nuclear, family.
The previous section argued that Biblical naturalism ultimately 
expresses an ideal that elevates family form over family function, unfairly 
excluding many families from the institutional benefits afforded marital 
families.  Liberal individualism has been able to operate within the 
conjugal construct, expanding the liberties of those within it, but not 
significantly opening its membership to other groups.  Some argue that, as 
it did with divorce, conjugality can adjust to accommodate same-sex 
couples;201 but compromise here is proving challenging.  As those who 
would defend marriage did with indissolubility (and then racial purity) in 
earlier centuries, many today view the opposite-sex requirement as one of 
the essential terms of the conjugal relationship.  A relationship that does 
not conform to that form is by definition not a conjugal/marital 
relationship.  Hence, those who would maintain the status quo rely heavily 
on natural law and Biblical theories.  Individuals who do not meet the 
formal pattern (one man, one woman) but seek to formalize their 
relationships advance numerous arguments.  Among them is the argument 
that the principle of liberal individualism permits them to structure their 
intimate lives as they see fit and that, by excluding their relationships 
(which can perform the same socially useful work as is performed by the 
traditional conjugal relationship) from the benefits accorded marriage, 
they are made less equal and left with less freedom than is afforded to 
199
 Contract law, for instance, can be seen as a constant compromise between 
autonomy and state paternalism aimed at protecting people from their bad 
bargains.
200
 That the institution excludes other family forms that perform the same 
functions remains, of course, its fundamental flaw.  The observation here, 
however, is simply that the marital family also performs these necessary 
functions.
201
 No one seriously believes that the two-person limit will be revisited any 
time soon.
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conforming groupings.  Giving same-sex couples entry into marriage 
would further liberal individual principles.202 To many, however, 
eliminating the opposite-sex requirement denatures the institution.  They 
can perceive no compromise.
Another area where the coexistence of both principles produces 
incoherence is the law of parenting, including the doctrine of parental 
rights, abuse and neglect laws, and child custody determinations.  Rights 
“over” children reinforced the conjugal, patriarchal family and were 
reflected by family privacy, which empowered a man to control his 
household, wife, and children.203  Now gender-neutral, the parental rights 
doctrine continues to exist.  The doctrine is couched in liberal-individual 
and rights-respecting terms, but it clashes with the fundamental tenets of 
liberal individualism (which denies that one individual could have rights 
over another).204  According to one critic, “[t]he parents are not trustees of 
a public good (society’s future citizens), but are owners of the individuals 
they have created (their children).”205
Liberal individual protections are now extended to children as well, 
and in custody proceedings, the state attempts to exert its parens patriae 
power to further children’s best interests.  But only to a limited extent.  
The coexistence of parents’ rights (Biblical naturalism) and children’s 
rights (liberal individualism) leads to undesirable outcomes that disserve 
children.  It has resulted in child custody rules in which a parent’s 
biological connection with a child can trump the child’s stronger 
emotional attachment to a non-parent.206  And conjugality, in turn, can 
trump both biology and emotional attachment.207  And in cases of 
suspected neglect or abuse, institutional practice is even more chaotic.  It 
is all too easy for the state to justify their “temporary” removal from the 
home, because it does not view itself as disrupting the legal right of 
parents to their children in these cases.  That a “legal” parent-child 
relationship continues to exist means nothing to a child, of course.  
Temporary removals, in about half of all cases, become long-term 
removals.  Because many parents fail to respond to state-provided services 
202
 It would not give them total freedom, of course, since their marriages 
would then exist within a pre-existing institutional structure.
203 See supra notes 45-50; 130-33; 154-65; and accompanying text.
204 See John Elster, Solomonic Judgments:  Against the Best Interest of the 
Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 54 (1987).  Elster discusses the tension between 
children’s rights/interests and parental rights, but argues that children’s interests 
should not trump those of their parents and that parental rights and needs should 
be considered.
205 See HERRING, supra note 164 (citing Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who 
Owns the Child”:  Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 995 (1992)).
206 See supra notes 45-50, and accompanying text.
207 See Michael H. v. Gerald G., 491 U.S. 110, and supra note 25 and 
accompanying text.
PRINCIPLES OF U.S. FAMILY LAW
45
and requirements (even when – as is not always the case – those services 
are actually offered), children remain in temporary care arrangements, 
often developing new attachments.  And because it is difficult to meet the 
heightened legal standard required in order to terminate parents’ rights to 
their children, it is usually years before children receive permanency.208
Together, the laws that express Biblical naturalism and liberal 
individualism shape doctrines that affect the lives of millions of 
individuals.  And together, its foundational principles are wreaking havoc 
on the most significant and wide-ranging of our family laws.
CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed a theory of the nature of U.S. family law 
that explains our social practices.  It draws from the structure of family 
law’s rules and practices the content of its key concepts—conjugality, 
privacy, contract, and parens patriae.  These practices and concepts both 
effectuate and make explicit the principles of Biblical naturalism and 
liberal individualism.209  These principles underlie our family law and 
unify many of our ordinary, unreflective beliefs and practices.210  Now 
that those principles have been exposed, we must examine what place in 
our public life we wish to give them.211  At a minimum, this Article seeks 
to launch a much-needed debate in family law on whether our current 
foundational principles are desirable, or even defensible.  More 
ambitiously, the Article seeks to ground a much-needed jurisprudence of 
family law that better reflects the social goals and needs of contemporary 
U.S. society.
208 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (requiring that decisions 
terminating parental rights be proven by clear and convincing evidence).  See 
also, Jennifer Wriggins, Parental Rights Termination Jurisprudence:  
Questioning the Framework, 52 S.C. L. REV. 241 (2000).
209 See COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 54-55.
210 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 155-56 (1977); 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48 (1971).
211 See COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 5.
